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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

IMPLICATIONS OF OFF-FARM INCOME FOR FARM INCOME
STABILIZATION POLICIES
This dissertation examines to what extent oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation may be an appropriate and accessible tool to mitigate the adverse eﬀects from market failures and
incompleteness in the crop and farm income insurance market. While the inﬂuence
of the nonfarm sector has long been recognized as a primary force in shaping farm
structure, oﬀ-farm income is rarely acknowledge as a risk management tool for operators and households of commercial farms. The dissertation develops a dynamic
model that includes capital market imperfections, economies of scale in farm production, and the presence of adjustment costs in labor allocation decisions. The model
provides a realistic characterization of the environment deﬁning income and ﬁnancial
risks faced by farm operators, as well as the risk management alternatives available
to them.
It is found that introducing oﬀ-farm labor can substantially mitigate the adverse
eﬀects of farm income risk on farm operators’ and households’ welfare, even for larger
commercial farms. However, the diversiﬁcation of labor by the main operator seems to
impose labor and managerial constraints that can reduce the intensity and technical
eﬃciency of the farm production. Alternatively, diversiﬁcation at the household level
through the allocation of spousal labor oﬀ the farm provides beneﬁts in mitigating
the adverse eﬀects of farm income risk on farm production and eﬃciency, and on
operators and households welfare. It thus provides an eﬃcient risk management
alternative that is consistent with most rationales that are invoked to justify farm
policies.
Results suggest that the increasing incidence and importance of oﬀ-farm income
within the farm population of most OECD countries is highly relevant in the design
of eﬀective farm policies This form of diversiﬁcation can reduce the need and eﬀectiveness of farm income stabilization polices. While it has been argued elsewhere that
broader economic policies had a large inﬂuence in closing the income gap between
farm and urban households, such policies may also have a role to play in addressing

farm income risk issues and, in some cases, may represent more sustainable and eﬃcient policy alternatives.
KEYWORDS: Oﬀ-farm Income, Agricultural Policy, Risk Management, Distance
Function, Dynamic Programming
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Chapter 1
Introduction

The inﬂuence of the nonfarm sector has long been recognized as a primary force in
shaping farm structure (Ruttan and Hayami, 1984; Chavas, Chambers, and Pope,
2010). And it is widely acknowledged that general economic growth and oﬀ-farm
work opportunities have played a central role in resolving the equity issues that motivated farm policies in their inception (Gardner, 2000; Tweeten, 2002; Schmitz, Moss,
and Schmitz, 2010). By now, the majority of OECD farm households are now earning an important share of their income from oﬀ-farm activities (Dimitri, Eﬄand, and
Conklin, 2005; OECD, 2009b; Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 2007; Satistics Canada, 2008).
Policies now tend to focus on farm income risk issues and much of the policy
debates center on the eﬃciency of subsidized crop and farm revenue insurance programs. Many economists argue that these programs are ineﬃcient because they tend
to crowd out private initiatives, including oﬀ-farm income. Hence, the role of oﬀ-farm
income as a private risk management tool has generated some interest. However, the
use of oﬀ-farm income as a risk management tool is usually presumed to be limited
to smaller farms. Nevertheless, data suggest that oﬀ-farm income represents more
than 20% of the total income of large and very large U.S. commercial farms on average(USDA, 2006; Park et al., 2011). Based on current policy concerns and the growing
importance of oﬀ-farm income as a component of farm households’ total income, this
dissertation set out to examine the extent to which oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation can mitigate the adverse eﬀect of farm income risk on resource allocation and welfare. Since
commercial farms represent the focus of such policies, the focus of the dissertation is
put on the potential of oﬀ-farm employment as a risk management tool for such farms.

1.1

Impact of Oﬀ-farm Employment on Farm Households

Oﬀ-farm income can aﬀect farm production and households’ welfare in a number of
ways. First of all, the oﬀ farm wage deﬁnes the opportunity cost of farm labor, thus
establishing a link between oﬀ-farm wages and farm labor allocation decisions, which
will in turn inﬂuence farm expansion decisions. As a result, labor market integration
tends to strengthen this link and to make these farm decisions more responsive to
changes in the terms of trade between farm and nonfarm sectors(Foltz and Aldana,
2006).
The decision to work oﬀ the farm also aﬀects the farm operation and technology
choices through the labor constraint that it may impose (Fernandez-Cornejo, 2007).
For example, it is suggested that the substitution eﬀect between labor and capital
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would lead part-time operator to have more capital intensive operations (O’Brien and
Hennessy, 2008). And, in turn, input choices may inﬂuence the environmental impact
of the farm operation (Phimister and Roberts, 2006). Yet, the most prominent eﬀect
of the constraints imposed by oﬀ-farm employment may be their negative impact on
the overall eﬃciency of the farm operation as they could preclude the achievement of
economies of scale.(Paul et al., 2004; Paul and Nehring, 2005; Nehring, FernandesCornejo, and Banker, 2005)
And the ﬁnancial implications of oﬀ-farm work are numerous. While oﬀ-farm
income provides a more diversiﬁed source of income (Mishra and Goodwin, 1997;
Mishra and Holthausen, 2002; Andersson, Ramamurtie, and Ramaswami, 2003; DaRocha and Restuccia, 2006; Blank and Erickson, 2007), its importance as a source of
liquidity supporting farm investment and capital gains cannot be overlooked (Blank
et al., 2004, 2009; Briggeman, 2011). At the same time, labor constraints may also
leads to the operation of smaller farms, thus reducing the need for farm capital and
equity and allowing part-time operators to diversify their investment portfolio oﬀ the
farm more easily (Foltz and Aldana, 2006; O’Brien and Hennessy, 2008).
Overall, the net impact of oﬀ-farm work on farm production and operators’ welfare
can be ambiguous. The diversiﬁcation and liquidity beneﬁts that it provides bolster
the ﬁnancial position of farm households. But the constraints it imposes on farm
operations may also reduce expected returns. This trade-oﬀ determines the extent
of the potential role of oﬀ-farm work in resolving the alleged farm income risk issues
that underly farm policies.

1.2

Risk Management Policies

In both, the U.S. and Canada, central policy instruments targeted at reducing farm income instability include crop insurance and farm revenues insurance (OECD, 2009a).
These farm insurance programs are heavily subsidized and their legitimacy is usually defended based on the incompleteness of insurance markets (e.g. Miranda and
Glauber, 1997; Goodwin, 2001). It is then argued that, if not for farm insurance
programs, the welfare of farm operators and the level of investment in farm production would be suboptimal, and that rural communities would lose direct and indirect
economic beneﬁts from farm production.
However, the virtues of those programs have been called into questions by many
economists (e.g. Tweeten, 2002; OECD, 2009a; Goodwin and Smith, 2013). It is argued that those programs are ineﬃcient and are crowding out a number of private
risk management initiatives, including oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation. Some even argued
that the social cost of those programs is greater than the cost of relying only on
incomplete private risk management tools (e.g. Tweeten, 2002; Gardner and Sumner,
2007; Glauber, 2007).
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For the most part, the analyses of these policies have focused on adverse selection and moral hazard issues using mean-variance and expected utility models (e.g.
Duncan and Myers, 2000; Coble and Knight, 2002; Mahul and Wright, 2003; Barnett
et al., 2005; Power, Vedenov, and Hong, 2009). However, this theoretical framework
may not be suited for the analysis of interactions between oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation
and farm insurance programs. As mentioned by Blank et al. (2009), standard meanvariance and expected utility models implicitly make the unrealistic assumption that
all income and wealth is consumed during one period. This may be a trivial assumption when focusing on annual production or insurance decisions, but is inappropriate
when focusing on multiperiod ﬁnancial issues.

1.3

Dissertation Overview

Chapter 2 of the dissertation provides an in-depth review of the literature pertaining
to the role and incidence of oﬀ-farm income among the farm community, and its relationships with farm policy objectives and instruments. This literature provides a few
empirical studies indicating a positive relationship between oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation
and farm income risk (Mishra and Goodwin, 1997; Mishra and Holthausen, 2002;
Mishra and Sandretto, 2002; Jette-Nantel et al., 2011). While these studies attest to
the role of oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation as a useful risk management tool, their capacity
to quantify the beneﬁt of oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation and its capacity to attenuate the
adverse eﬀect of farm income risk remain limited.
In order to address the central question of the dissertation, Chapter 3 is devoted
to the development of a theoretical model that attempts to capture the nature of
the interactions between farm income risk and oﬀ-farm labor. While risk studies and
farm insurance program analysis commonly use mean-variance and expected utility
models in a static setting, I draw from the buﬀer stock saving models presented in the
ﬁnance and macroeconomic literature to develop a dynamic farm life-cycle model. A
key advantage of such a model is the capacity to integrate the eﬀect of capital market
imperfections and to combine production and ﬁnancial risks within a single model.
This is of particular interest here since farm insurance programs are targeting production risk while oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation does not aﬀect farm production risk directly,
but rather provides a source of liquidity that can reduce ﬁnancial risk. In such models
agents are allowed to endogenously balance the two sources of risk and labor income
tends to act as a risk free asset, allowing for consumption smoothing, more aggressive
investment in risky assets, and for reduction in the demand for insurance. In Chapter
3, I adapt this framework in a farm-life cycle model and I argue that such a dynamic
model provides a more thorough and realistic characterization of the level of risk
faced by farm operators, and is thus better suited to assess the potential interactions
between oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation and farm insurance programs.
Aside from its impact on farm ﬁnancial decisions and household’s welfare, diversiﬁcation of labor oﬀ the farm may also impose constraints on farm production. Some
3

of the studies reviewed in Chapter 2 suggest a negative relationship between farm
production eﬃciency and oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation. In Chapter 4, Kentucky farm data
are used to estimate the relationship between farm production and oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation. First, the estimation results allows the testing of whether oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation imposes a loss of farm production eﬃciency and also if some rebalancing of farm
inputs can reduce this loss. Second, it allows the derivation of the parameters necessary to calibrate the farm production function included in the dynamic farm model.
Within the estimation procedure, particular attention is given to the theoretical
consistency of the estimates, something that was not done in previous literature (Paul
et al., 2004; Paul and Nehring, 2005; Nehring, Fernandes-Cornejo, and Banker, 2005).
The estimation is performed using a Bayesian algorithm which provides the ﬂexibility
to impose the appropriate theoretical restrictions. It is found that imposing theoretical consistency on the estimates can have large impact on parameters and elasticity
estimates.
In Chapter 5, numerical solutions and simulations of the calibrated model are used
to examine the impact of oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation on the adverse eﬀect of reductions
in the coverage oﬀered by farm revenue insurance programs. The analysis seeks to
understand the balance between the cost of diversiﬁcation, reﬂected in the estimated
function in Chapter 4, and the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation. More speciﬁcally,
solutions and simulations results are used to answer the following questions:
• Can oﬀ-farm employment eﬀectively reduce the adverse eﬀect of incomplete risk
markets on farm production and investment?
• Can oﬀ-farm employment eﬀectively reduce the adverse eﬀect of incomplete risk
markets on farm operator’s and household’s welfare?
Finally, Chapter 6 provides concluding thoughts on the results from this study and
the relationship between oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation trends and current policy objectives
and instruments. Limitations are also addressed and possible directions for future
research are discussed.

c Simon Jette-Nantel 2013
Copyright 
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Chapter 2
Oﬀ-farm Income and Farm Policies

This chapter reviews the literature related to oﬀ-farm work and its relation with
farm policies. The ﬁrst section reviews trends in oﬀ-farm income and the theoretical
frameworks that have been developed to understand the forces explaining farm and
oﬀ-farm labor allocation decisions. The empirical literature is also covered, providing
the actual evidence relating to the theory of farm labor allocation. The second part
focuses on the implications of the increasing incidence of oﬀ-farm income for diﬀerent
farm policy objectives and instruments.

2.1

Oﬀ-farm Income: Trends and Determinants

Over the last 50 years oﬀ-farm income has become an increasingly important component of farm households’ income. Across OECD countries, the majority of farm
households are now diverting some of their resources, either capital or labor, towards
oﬀ-farm activities (Huﬀman, 1977; Dimitri, Eﬄand, and Conklin, 2005; FernandezCornejo et al., 2007; Satistics Canada, 2008; OECD, 2009b) (see Table 2.1). In the
U.S. the share of total farm household income coming from oﬀ-farm sources rose from
50% in 1960 to more than 80% in recent years (Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 2007). Similarly, in Canada the percentage of operators reporting oﬀ-farm work went from 34%
in 1976 to 48.4% in 2006 (Satistics Canada, 2008). These trends strongly suggest
that oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation can be beneﬁcial to farm households and that a growing
number of these households have been able to take advantage of oﬀ-farm opportunities.
The accessibility and desirability of oﬀ-farm income varies depending on farm and
farm household characteristics and location. As a result, oﬀ-farm income is likely to
play a diﬀerent role among diﬀerent farm households, and may have diﬀerent policy
implications across regions. For example, oﬀ-farm income is more common among
operators and households of smaller farms. Yet, as Figure 2.1 shows, in 2004 oﬀfarm income still represented about 36% of the total income of large U.S. commercial
farms, and 17% of the total income of very large farms (USDA, 2006)1 .
Bollman (1979) provides a basic theoretical framework that captures the main
forces explaining the allocation of labor on and oﬀ the farm (see Figure 2.2). The
main components of that framework are the labor supply curve (SOL ), the farm labor
demand curve (V V1 ) and the oﬀ-farm wage rate (WB ). While simple, this framework
1

The 2010 statistics reported by Park et al. (2011) indicate that oﬀ-farm income represented
24% of total income for large and very large commercial farms in the U.S.
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Table 2.1: Composition of farm household income in OECD countries
Off-farm
Farming labour
activities
Australia

Investment
Other
Transfers
and property
sources

Total

Definition of a farm

Household members whose
income is taken into account

2004/05-2006/07
1995/96-1997/98
1986/87-1988/89

68
65
78

nri
nri
nri

nri
nri
nri

nri
nri
nri

32
35
22

100
100
100

Minimum sales:
AUD 22 500 (AUD 40 000 from 2005/06)Operator and spouse
USD 18 825 (USD 33 467 from 2005/06)

Austria

2004-06
1995-97

54
63

30
22

nri
nri

nri
nri

17
15

100
100

Minimum SGM:
EUR 7 200 or USD 10 000

Canada

2003-05
1995-97
1985-87

7
24
30

64
53
49

8
8
10

16
10
9

5
5
2

100
100
100

Denmark

2004-06
1996-98

42
47

43
34

7
11

7
8

0
0

Finland

2003-05
1996

27
28

42
39

18
17

13
16

France

2003
1997

53
67

31
19

9
6

Germany

2003/04-2005/06
1995/96-1997/98

80
85

nri
nri

Ireland

2004/05
1995
1987

32
51
49

2004-06*
1995-97
1985-87

Definition
a farm
household
Narrow

Operator and spouse

Narrow

Minimum revenue:
CAD 10 000 or USD 9 300

Operator and spouse

Broad

100
100

Minimum area:
10 ha

All members under
the same dwelling

Broad

0
0

100
100

Minimum area:
2 ha

Operator and spouse

Broad

8
8

0
0

100
100

Minimum area: 12 ha
Minimum labour unit: 0.75

All members declaring income
for tax purpose together

Narrow

nri
nri

nri
nri

20
15

100
100

Minimum SGM: 16 ESU or USD 26 300 Operator and spouse
Minimum labour unit: 1

Narrow

45
31
24

2
2
2

19
13
19

2
3
6

100
100
100

Any gain from agricultural activity

All members

Broad

25
15
14

33
65
65

nri
nri
nri

29
nri
nri

13
20
21

100
100
100

Minimum area: 0.3 ha
Min. sales: JPY 500 000 or USD 4 250

All members
From 2004, only those
engaged in agriculture

Broad

2004-06
1995-97
1985/87
1996
2006

39
46
64
41
29

32
34
18
31
40

nri
nri
nri
13
9

29
20
18
nri
nri

0
0
0
16
23

100
100
100
100
100

Minimum area: 0.1 ha
Minimum sales: USD 1 000

All members

Broad

Rural areas
Main economic activity in agriculture

All members

Narrow

Netherlands

2004-06
1996

74
73

11
nri

nri
nri

nri
nri

15
27

100
100

Minimum SGM:
16 ESU or USD 26 300

Operator and spouse

Narrow

Norway

2004-06*
1999-2001

31
33

50
50

14
11

5
6

0
0

100
100

Any agricultural taxable income

Operator and spouse

Broad

Poland

2003-06
1998-2000

67
73

8
2

0
0

21
22

3
3

100
100

Main source of income from agriculture

All members

Narrow

Switzerland

2004-06
1995-97

Minimum area: 16 ha
Minimum number of cows: 6

Japan

Korea

Mexico

72
81

nri
nri

nri
nri

nri
nri

28
19

100
100

United Kingdom 2002/03-2004/05
1995/96-1997/98
1985/86-1987/88

40
53
57

28
18
19

21
21
20

11
8
5

0
0
0

100
100
100

United States

11
11
35

65
nri
nri

6
nri
nri

13
nri
nri

6
89
65

100
100
100

2006
1995-97
1985-87*

All members

Narrow
Broad

Any income from agricultural activity

Operator and spouse
declaring income together

Minimum sales:
USD 1 000

All members

Broad

nri: not reported independently; SGM: Standard Gross Margin; ESU: European Size Unit.
Data are not comparable across country as definitions of farm households and methodologies differ.
* change in methodology, see Annex 8.1.
Source: National statistics as reported in Annex II.1.

Source: OECD(2009),p.86
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Figure 2.1: Mean Farm, Oﬀ-Farm and Total Operator Household Income, 2004

$1,000 per operator household

Farm

Off-farm

Total

290

271.2

240

223.7

190
140

124.3
96.8

90
58.4

62.5

70.3

58.1 62.9
34.3 36.0

40
-10

96.4

13.6

7.7

-5.9

Limitedresource

67.3

81.5

47.4

44.8

14.2

4.1

-0.3

4.8

Retirement

Residential

Low -sales

Rural Residence

79.5

Medium-sales

Intermediate

Large

Very large

All

Commercial

*Typology deﬁned by Hoppe, Perry, and Banker (2000)

Source: USDA (2006, p.6)

provides a basic structure to understand the various factors that can potentially aﬀect
the allocation between on and oﬀ the farm employment.

Labor supply
The labor supply of farm operators and households reﬂects choices between labor
and leisure consumption. According to labor economic theory, the elasticity of labor
supply is deﬁned by the substitution and income eﬀect. At lower wage levels the
labor supply is more elastic as increase in wages will lead to a substitution of leisure
for more work hours. At higher level of wages, the supply becomes inelastic since the
income eﬀect dominates thus favoring an increase in leisure instead of worked hours
(Ehrenberg and Smith, 1993; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). Wealth and unearned
income are also key factors in deﬁning labor supply. Through an income eﬀect, unearned income will reduce labor supply. For example, in a situation similar to what
is depicted in ﬁgure 2.2, Chang, Huang, and Chen (2012) showed that a change in
direct payments would be expected to shift the labor supply leading to a change in
the number of hours worked oﬀ the farm and leaving the farm labor supply untouched.
Another key element in deﬁning operators and household labor supply is the number of household members and the decision of the operator’s spouse to work oﬀ-farm
or not. The empirical literature suggests that the labor allocation of the operator
7

Figure 2.2: Oﬀ-farm labor supply and demand

Source: Bollman (1982)
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and the spouse are joint decisions (Lass, Findeis, and Hallberg, 1989; Kimhi and Lee,
1996; Kimhi and Bollman, 1999; Benjamin and Kimhi, 2006; El-Osta, Mishra, and
Morehart, 2008). Since the spouse’s on-farm labor contribution is often secondary,
the labor allocation decision of spouses are usually not directly connected with farm
labor supply making the possible interactions between farm production and spousal
labor allocation much more limited (Kimhi and Lee, 1996; Benjamin and Kimhi,
2006). These interactions are more likely to be indirect through the ﬁnancial and
liquidity contribution of spousal income. For example, Bjornsen and Mishra (2012)
ﬁnd that spousal oﬀ-farm work tends to increase farm eﬃciency while Moss, Mishra,
and Uematsu (2012) ﬁnd that spousal oﬀ-farm work is related to lower farm debt
levels. In 2010, 82 percent of farm operators reported being married and about half
of their spouses worked oﬀ the farm(Ahearn, February 23, 2012).

Demand for farm labor and management
Theoretically, the demand for farm labor is derived from the marginal value product
of farm labor ( M Plabor · Py ). As such, any factor aﬀecting farm productivity will shift
the farm labor demand. Hence, the farm labor demand will depend on farm technology and constraints. More labor-demanding enterprises, such as dairy, will shift
the demand outwards compare to other enterprises like grain production. The empirical literature has provided numerous studies supporting the theory(Bollman, 1979;
Furtan, Van Kooten, and Thompson, 1985; Mishra and Goodwin, 1997; Howard and
Swidinsky, 2000; Mishra and Holthausen, 2002; Alasia et al., 2007; El-Osta, Mishra,
and Morehart, 2008).
Technological change is recognized as a key driver behind farm structural changes,
including trends in oﬀ-farm income (Huﬀman, 1977; Cochrane, 1987; Gardner, 1992;
O’Brien and Hennessy, 2008). A key aspect of technology in determining farm labor
demand is the degree of substitution between operators’ labor and other farm inputs.
Benjamin and Kimhi (2006) found, based on data from French farm households, that
hired labor tends to be a substitute for farm household labor. They further indicate
that these results contrast with previous studies (e.g. Benjamin, Corsi, and Guyomard, 1996), which found hired labor to complement farm operators’ labor. They
also found that this substitutability increased with the level of human capital of the
farm operator. This may reﬂect the greater degree of integration between farm and
non-farm labor market induced by the ease of commuting and higher education of
operators. But it may also reﬂect the development of better human resource management skills among farm operators (e.g.Canadian Agricultural Human Resource
Council (2013)).
The substitutability between farm capital and labor is also well documented (e.g.
Binswanger, 1974; Lopez, 1980; Chavas, Chambers, and Pope, 2010). However, the
interaction between oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation and farm capital is more complex. For
example, Ahituv and Kimhi (2002) ﬁnd an ambiguous relation between farm capital
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and oﬀ-farm work. They found a relationship that is in general negative except for
a group of "high ability" operators that are able to work oﬀ the farm while maintaining a capital-intensive farm enterprise. The use of variable inputs may also be
aﬀected by the decision to work oﬀ the farm. Phimister and Roberts (2006) ﬁnd
that oﬀ-farm work reduces the use of fertilizer and increases the use of crop protection inputs. Fernandez-Cornejo, Hendricks, and Mishra (2005) ﬁnds that adoption of
herbicide-tolerant crops is positively related to oﬀ-farm work and to an increase in
overall household income.
Yet, the most prominent eﬀect of oﬀ-farm employment on the farm labor demand
may be due to the presence of economies of scale. In the presence of economies of
scale, diversiﬁcation of labor would implies a loss of farm eﬃciency. Some studies of
U.S. farms from the 1980’s found no evidence that part-time operators were less eﬃcient than full-time farmers (Singh and Williamson Jr, 1981; Bagi, 1984). But more
recent studies of U.S. farm households concluded that there is a signiﬁcant tradeoﬀ between farm eﬃciency and oﬀ-farm labor supply (Paul et al., 2004; Paul and
Nehring, 2005; Nehring, Fernandes-Cornejo, and Banker, 2005; Fernandez-Cornejo,
Nehring, and Erickson, 2007). They attribute this eﬃciency loss to the presence of
economies of scale in U.S. agriculture. However, most of the empirical evidence suggest that economies of scale are limited to a range of relatively small farms, while
average cost are constant for medium to large farms (Chavas, Chambers, and Pope,
2010). In addition, it appears that economies of scale are more important in the
livestock sector than in the crop sector (MacDonald, O’Donoghue, and Hoppe, 2010).
For crop farms, Nehring, Fernandes-Cornejo, and Banker (2005) also conclude
that including oﬀ-farm income as an output of the household makes the eﬃciency of
households specialized in oﬀ-farm activities comparable to that of household specialized in farm enterprises. They attribute these results to the presence of economies
of scope between farm and oﬀ-farm enterprises. These may occur if, for example,
period of higher labor demand from oﬀ-farm enterprises coincides with downtimes
on the farm. In line with this hypothesis, Fernandez-Cornejo, Nehring, and Erickson
(2007) conﬁrmed that oﬀ-farm income increases the overall eﬃciency of households
operating crop farms, but found that it decreases eﬃciency of households operating
dairy farms. Overall, these results would imply that, on average, oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation may impose an eﬃciency loss in terms of farm production, but, at least for
crop farms, it does not imply an eﬃciency loss in terms of the contribution of the
household to the overall economy.

Demand for oﬀ-farm labor
The inﬂuence of the nonfarm sector has long been recognized as a leading force in
shaping farm structure (Ruttan and Hayami, 1984; Chavas, Chambers, and Pope,
2010). Economic growth, increasing demand for oﬀ-farm labor, and increasing oﬀfarm wages have induced technological development that led to a large outﬂow of
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labor from the farm sector. However, some degree of farm labor ﬁxity, induced for
example by transfer or moving costs and the non-monetary value of farming, prevented a full adjustment of the farm sector to the economic conditions (Tweeten,
1970).
The integration and diversiﬁcation of the rural economy has increased the accessibility of oﬀ-farm employment. In general, the likelihood of oﬀ-farm work and the
level of oﬀ-farm income depends on local and regional socio-economic characteristics
as well as the proximity to urban centers and access to urban labor markets (Alasia
et al., 2007). Foltz and Aldana (2006) actually report that local economic conditions
and wages may have a greater impact on farm investment than agricultural policies.
Finally, human capital is another key variable that can aﬀect the oﬀ-farm wage. The
empirical literature reports a positive relationship between education and oﬀ-farm
work (Huﬀman, 1980; Howard and Swidinsky, 2000; Benjamin and Kimhi, 2006; Alasia et al., 2007). The impact of human capital on oﬀ-farm work could be ambiguous
as it is also expected to have a positive impact on farm labor demand. But, Sumner
(1982) reports that the eﬀect is larger on oﬀ-farm labor demand.

Labor allocation and life-cycle dynamics
Labor allocation decisions are part of a lifetime decision-making process (MaCurdy,
1981; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). A number of elements contribute to the dynamic nature of labor supply. For example, adjustment costs involved in change
of employment may induce some degree of ﬁxity in labor resource allocation. Human and ﬁnancial capital accumulation can also play a role in deﬁning labor supply
and the life cycle patterns of employment and earnings (Sumner, 1982; Blundell and
MaCurdy, 1999). As a result, oﬀ-farm work decision can be expected to follow some
common life-cycle patterns.
Oﬀ-farm work is often thought of as a transitory step that can either help younger
farmers to enter the farm sector or smooth the transition of older operators towards
farm exit (Tweeten and Zulauf, 1994; Stiglbauer, Weiss et al., 1999; Weiss, 1999;
Kimhi and Bollman, 1999; Kimhi, 2000). However, there is evidence that oﬀ-farm
work is more than a transitory phase within the farm life-cycle, and that it is an
enduring feature for many farm operators and families (Bollman and Steeves, 1982;
Olfert and Stabler, 1994; Kimhi, 2000). In fact, oﬀ-farm work is thought to have a
stabilizing eﬀect on farm structure (Gardner, 1992). The empirical results tend to
show that oﬀ-farm work reduces the likelihood of farm exit. For example, Bollman
(1982) report that a small amount of oﬀ-farm work reduces the probability of farm
exit while a larger amount increases that probability. While Kimhi and Bollman
(1999) does not discriminate based on the level of oﬀ-farm income, simply stating
that oﬀ-farm income in general reduces the tendency to exit farming. Similar conclusions were also reached by Glauben, Tietje, and Weiss (2006).

11

2.2

Policy Implication of Oﬀ-farm Diversiﬁcation

The fact that farm operators and families take part in other economic activities is
not new to agriculture. Farmers at all times have sought to complement farm income
by diversifying labor to other activities and the increasing importance of oﬀ-farm
income and part-time farming can be traced back at least to the 1930’s(Salter and
Diehl, 1940; Huﬀman, 1977; Bollman, 1979). What may have changed over time is
the economic and policy context in which it takes place, and with it the importance
of the phenomenon in both economic and political terms has also changed.

An historical perspective
The rightful place of part-time farming and its appropriate consideration under farm
policies has been a source of debate for a long time. At times, part-time farming and
oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation have been considered as either irrelevant to farm policy objectives or inconsistent with them. An early example is provided by Salter and Diehl
(1940), who wrote: "[a]ttempts to promote part-time farming have been popularly referred to as ’abolishing’ the farmer or ’plowing him under’ "(p.585). In the aftermath
of the Great Depression, the perception was that part-time operators could represent
an unfair competition that weakened the output market of the full-time farmer. On
the other hand, the perceived advantage of encouraging part-time farming was "that
the agricultural activities of part-time farmers [...] act as an economic cushion in
periods of industrial unemployment"(p.586).
Needless to say, the economic and political context has changed dramatically.
Since then, part-time farming and oﬀ-farm income have played a key role in shaping
actual farm structure. Oﬀ-farm work has been recognized as an important mechanism to transfer wealth and resources between agriculture and other sectors of the
economy. Historically, low returns to farm resources have been the central issue underlying farm income policy (Gardner, 1987, 1992, 2000; Schmitz, Moss, and Schmitz,
2010). These low returns suggested the presence of excess resources in the farm sector
and a disequilibrium between farm and non-farm sectors. This chronic overcapacity
is usually explained by some combination of technological improvement, labor-saving
technology in particular, the presence of economies of scale, and a low income elasticity of farm outputs. These are central forces underlying the industrialization and
commercialization process of agriculture and led to the diminishing relative contribution of primary agriculture in terms of employment and economic activity for the
global, and even the rural economy. Meanwhile, the inability of the farm sector to
adjust to these pressures have been explained by, some degree of asset ﬁxity, low
opportunity costs of farm resources, and some disconnection between farm and nonfarm resource markets (Johnson, 1950; Johnson and Pasour, 1981).
The ongoing decrease in farm numbers reﬂects the constant pressure to transfer
labor resources out of the farm sector. However, the degree of integration between
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farm and non-farm labor markets has seemingly increased. The non-farm sector has
increased in volume compared to the farm sector, making it easier to absorb excess
farm labor. And commuting between rural areas and urban centers has also become
easier, in part due to improvement in infrastructures and to the urban sprawl that
took place over the last decades and likely reduced the distance between urbanized
areas and farmers (Alasia et al., 2007). The increasing level of education of farm
operators and their families is also a potent candidate in explaining the higher degree
of mobility of farm labor resources.
Over the last 50 years, these adjustments in resource allocation were strongly
linked to the debates underlying the development of agricultural policies, as the following statement illustrates.

Agricultural policy is currently up for review and revision. The dramatic
long-term changes in the interaction between farm and nonfarm labor
markets between 1950 and 1970 should be recognized in drafting new
legislation. It will be easy to draft legislation that eﬀectively attempts
to protect agriculture from needed long-term resource adjustments, especially the reduction of labor in agriculture. To the extent that protection
is successful, it only delays the time when resource adjustment must occur.
Huﬀman (1977) p.1060
Although Huﬀman’s policy recommendations have been ignored for the most part,
the overcapacity of the farm sector remained and maintained pressure for resource
adjustments. And, by now, data shows that farm families have an average income
level comparable to other families (Park et al., 2011), such that the traditional farm
income problem is no longer a policy concern. This adjustment in resource allocation
is generally attributed to oﬀ-farm income and the improving economic conditions in
non-farm sectors.

... farmers’ incomes beneﬁted from the sector’s becoming better integrated with a growing rural nonfarm economy, through oﬀ-farm jobs and
opportunities to leave farming altogether, which increased the marginal
value of labor of those lower-income households that remained in farming. If government policies are to be credited for this, they are the overall
macroeconomic and industrial policies that permitted the U.S. market
economy generally to develop and to ﬂourish.
Gardner (2000) p.1073
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Part-time farming and modern policies
Despite the acknowledged role of labor mobility in solving previous policy issues,
there remain some policy debates surrounding oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation and, most importantly, part-time operations. Because farm structural changes can aﬀect farms’
societal value and their economic performance, these changes have long fueled farm
policy debates. And, given complex and often ill-deﬁned policy objectives, it is not
surprising to ﬁnd that oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation still generates some debates.
Some economists have expressed concerns over the inconsistency of part-time operation with farm policies. For example, Blank (2002) observed that small farms are
generally not proﬁtable and must therefore be "subsidized" by oﬀ-farm work. The author then argues that the objective of operators cannot be pure proﬁt maximization.
Instead, operators of small farms must see farming as a hobby or a "way-of-life", and
to the extent that oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation is induced by such objectives it is inconsistent with alleged policy objectives which tend to focus on farm production, eﬃciency,
and competetiveness (Blank, 2002).
On the other hand, Cochrane (1987) states that rural communities dominated
by "factory" farms oﬀer poor quality of life while "a rural community with a heavy
concentration of medium to modest sized farmers with a high degree of land ownership
by the farmers involved results in a rural community with a high quality of life"(p.7).
This passage basically amounts to a statement of the longstanding Goldschmidt thesis
(Lobao, 1990; Lobao and Meyer, 2001). In addition, Cochrane argues that part-time
operators have been "short-changed" by commodity programs and that policies should
be targeted at "modest-size" operations to support them in developing successful
farming enterprises. While there has been some attempts to improve the targeting of
commodity programs by imposing payment limits, improvement in the distributional
aspect of commodity programs have been modest at best (Sumner, 1991; Gundersen
et al., 2000).
The apparent divergence of opinion on the rightful treatment of part-time and
smaller farm operations by public policies appears to hinge heavily on what one sees
as the ultimate objective behind farm policy and the criteria on which to judge farm
programs. If the policy objective can be narrowed down to the stimulation of farm
investment and competitiveness, then farm eﬃciency may be a relevant criteria and
supporting part-time "hobby" operations, through either commodity programs, direct payments or ﬁscal advantages, may be counterproductive (Blank and Erickson,
2007). However, if the ultimate policy objective remains broader and encompasses
some distributional concerns, then it may be best deﬁned with respect to the eﬃcient
allocation of resources within the wider economy. Consequently, the impact of parttime farming should be assessed not only with respect to their contribution to the
farm sector but with respect to their contribution to the braoder rural and national
economy. Assessing this contribution is much more complex, as it spans multiple
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economic sectors and involves spatial and sectoral interdependencies which may not
be fully understood (Kilkenny and Partridge, 2009).
Therefore, because oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation may have some implications for farm
structure, which may in turn aﬀect farm performance and local communities, some
of the interactions between farm policy objectives and oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation can be
seen as part of a larger debate on the appropriate balance between place-based rural
policies and sector-based agricultural policies. While current farm sectoral policies
are leaning increasingly on the incompleteness of risk markets to justify public intervention (Goodwin and Smith, 2013), champions of placed-based policies argue that
location and resource immobility are likely to create greater distortions and eﬃciency
losses than any failure in commodity and risk markets (Kraybill and Kilkenny, 2003).
Given the declining the economic importance of agriculture in most regions, some
have argued that it might be advantageous to recognize the contribution of various
economic sectors to rural livelihood and to shift the policy focus away from agricultural and sectoral policies and towards a more broad-based approach (Anderson, 1998;
Freshwater, 1997; OECD, 2001; Kraybill and Kilkenny, 2003; OECD, 2006a,b). Moreover, much in the same way that in the aftermath of the Great Depression part-time
farming was seen as a potential stabilizing force to help rural populations cope with
possible industrial downturns (Salter and Diehl, 1940), some authors have proposed
to use rural development policies as a tool to help stabilize farm households’ income
(Kostov and Lingard, 2001, 2003). In both cases, the interdependencies among sectors of a regional economy and the mobility of resources between sectors is recognized
and put forward as a key mechanism to cope with economic shocks.
Despite the interest in issues relating farm structure to rural development and the
broader economic impact of the agricultural sector, these are not directly addressed in
this dissertation. Knowledge of these arguments and debates is crucial to understand
the diﬀerent views and criticisms that might be raised when discussing the policy
implications of oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation, but this dissertation is mainly concerned with
commercial agriculture, as opposed to "hobby" farms, and the role that oﬀ-farm income may have in addressing the alleged issues underlying risk management policies
currently in place. Thus, an empirical assessment of the impacts and ramiﬁcations
of oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation and part-time farming for rural development and broader
economic issues is well beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Oﬀ-farm income and farm income risk
By the 1990’s, the equity and distributional concerns over chronically depressed farm
income had faded and the policy focus shifted towards other issues including farm
income risk (Gardner, 1987, 1992; Knutson, Penn, and Flinchbaugh, 1998; Tweeten,
2002). While depressed income among farm families reﬂected the need for long-term
adjustments in resource allocation between farm and non-farm sectors, the issue of
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farm income risk relates to the diﬃculties of the farm sector to adjust to, and to
cope with, short-term income shocks. Implicitly, the policy paradigm based on farm
income risk assumes that long-term returns to farm operation are adequate or, at the
very least, that resources can adjust to long-term changes in farm returns.
Theoretical foundations underlying the concerns over short-term adjustments are
usually based on large price and yield variability, over which individual farmers have
little control. The arguments typically build on the inelastic nature of supply and demand for agricultural commodities, which exacerbate prices swings induced by shifts
in supply, and on producers’ exposure to ﬁnancial risks. It suggests that farmers
are exposed to unusually large income risks that are uncontrollable at the ﬁrm level.
But, most importantly, the argument builds on the uninsurability of these risks due
to their spatial and serial correlation. It is then argued that, if farmers are risk averse,
their welfare and the level of investment in farm production would be suboptimal,
and that rural communities would lose direct and indirect economic beneﬁts from
farm production. Hence, uncertainty, combined with the risk aversion of farmers and
the failure of private markets to supply adequate risk transfer mechanisms motivates
public intervention(Gardner, 1987; Miranda and Glauber, 1997; Knutson, Penn, and
Flinchbaugh, 1998; Goodwin, 2001; Schmitz, Moss, and Schmitz, 2010).
In both the U.S. and Canada, central policy instruments targeted at reducing farm
income instability include subsidized crop insurance and farm revenue insurance programs . However, the virtues of those programs have been called into questions by
many economists (e.g. Tweeten, 2002; OECD, 2009a; Goodwin and Smith, 2013).
It is argued that those programs are ineﬃcient and are crowding out a number of
private risk management initiatives, including oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation. Many have
argued in favor of major reforms and reductions in the level of subsidies provided in
the programs, and some even argued that the social cost of the programs is greater
than the cost of relying only on incomplete private risk management tools (Tweeten,
2002; Babcock and Hart, 2006; Gardner and Sumner, 2007; Glauber, 2007).
In itself, oﬀ-farm income does not aﬀect the variability of farm income. It may,
however, dampen the adverse eﬀects attributed to farm income risk. The empirical
literature provides a number of studies suggesting the existence of a relationship between farm income risk and the incidence of oﬀ-farm income (Kyle, 1993; Mishra and
Goodwin, 1997; Mishra and Holthausen, 2002; Jette-Nantel et al., 2011). These empirical results hint that either farmers respond to farm income shocks by diversifying
their income portfolio via oﬀ-farm activities, or that diversiﬁed farm households tend
to venture into more risky farm enterprises. In both cases, this would imply that farm
production decisions are conditioned on the risk and return of an income portfolio
that includes oﬀ-farm components. This, then, suggests that assessing the impact of
farm policy on farm households’ welfare and on farms’ resource allocation decisions
should be done in an holistic framework, including oﬀ-farm income, especially if policies are targeted at income stabilization (OECD, 2009a).

16

The diversiﬁcation provided by oﬀ-farm income may have a substantial eﬀect on
farm households and operators’ decisions. In order to provide diversiﬁcation beneﬁts
in mitigating the eﬀect of farm income shocks, farm and non-farm activities must
share a low correlation, which they usually do. For most OECD countries, Da-Rocha
and Restuccia (2006) report that agriculture has counter-cyclical properties such that
one would expect most oﬀ-farm income and investments to be unrelated or even negatively related to farm income shocks.
However, the value of oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation will be deﬁned in part by its impact
on farm structure and farm performance. To the extent that oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation
imposes labor or managerial constraints, it could impose an eﬃciency cost that would
reduce the potential beneﬁts of oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation as a risk management tool. In
other words, the diversiﬁcation premium related to oﬀ-farm work may be relatively
high.
There may also be additional ﬁnancial beneﬁts from oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation. In
trying to deﬁne the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation, one must keep in mind that while the
empirical literature indicates that farmers alter their behavior in presence of risk and
that oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation is one alternative amid a list of possible responses, the
underlying cause leading to this risk response remains mostly unknown (Just and
Pope, 2003). Although most economists surmise that risk aversion is an important
factor, estimating and testing for the presence of risk aversion has turned out to be
a challenging enterprise that remains largely unsuccessful(Lence, 2009; Just, Khantachavana, and Just, 2010). At the same time, a number of competing alternatives
can explain farmers’ behavior, including credit constraints, and the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation may depend in part on the origins of farmers’ risk response.
In fact, a part of the empirical literature would suggest that oﬀ-farm income may
play a key role in providing suﬃcient liquidity to ensure farm ﬁnancial viability and
to smooth household consumption over time. Kwon, Orazem, and Otto (2006) found
empirical evidence of a relationship between oﬀ-farm income and temporary farm income shocks. This suggests that U.S. farm households face liquidity constraints and
use oﬀ-farm income to smooth consumption.
And, returns to farm investment appear to be deﬁned in great part by capital
gains on land and other farm assets (Blank, 2005; Blank et al., 2009). To the extent
that returns to farming are deﬁned by capital gains, their realization requires the
ability to generate enough income to satisfy liquidity requirements over the lifetime
of the farm. Blank and Erickson (2007) argues that oﬀ-farm income has only a minor
impact in determining farm household wealth, but that "it enables farm households
to ’pay the bills’ while capital gains accumulate over time through the appreciation
of farm capital - mostly farmland."(p.11).
In addition, there are a number of empirical studies that found evidence of capital market imperfections and credits constraints within the farm sectors of OECD
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countries (Phimister, 1995; Bierlen and Featherstone, 1998; Bierlen, Ahrendsen, and
Dixon, 1998; Benjamin and Phimister, 2002; Briggeman, Towe, and Morehart, 2009).
Other empirical evidence directly relates oﬀ-farm income to the presence of ﬁnancial
constraints. The empirical ﬁndings of Weersink (2008), based on Canadian data,
suggest a positive relation between farm debt-to-equity ratio and oﬀ-farm work while
Briggeman (2011) shows that many U.S. farms depend heavily on oﬀ-farm income to
service their debt.
Nevertheless, the expected utility model remains the workhorse of risk analysis
and a few authors have used it to analyze oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation decisions. First, applying a standard expected return-variance model, Blank and Erickson (2007) show
that increases in return to oﬀ-farm labor would lead operators to increase oﬀ-farm
work and also to opt for riskier farm production plans. They also show how, in a
static framework under complete markets, the presence of economies of scale would
lead operators of larger farms to reduce their level of oﬀ-farm work.
Andersson, Ramamurtie, and Ramaswami (2003) analyzed oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation
using a dynamic portfolio optimization model under the assumption of perfect capital and labor markets. The model assumes risky oﬀ-farm income, and risky farm
and non-farm assets. The authors show that oﬀ-farm income generates a wealth effect that stimulates farm investment. The presence of oﬀ-farm income also induces a
portfolio rebalancing eﬀect, the sign of which depends on the correlations between the
diﬀerent assets and oﬀ-farm income. Given the low correlation between farm asset
return and other ﬁnancial assets, a positive rebalancing eﬀect is most likely, leading
to a further increase in farm investment. Consequently, the authors conclude that
even if farm assets are riskier than other assets, if the correlation between farm assets
and oﬀ-farm income is low compared to the correlation with other assets, oﬀ-farm
work will induce an increase in farm investment.
These theoretical models did not consider the possibility of either labor or capital
market imperfections. Foltz and Aldana (2006) imposed a hard constraint on labor
within a deterministic dynamic model. They showed that if farm investment and
labor are complements, an increase in the wage rate has a negative eﬀect on farm
investment, while the eﬀect of an increase in farm output price is ambiguous. The
diﬀerence in results between Andersson, Ramamurtie, and Ramaswami (2003) and
Foltz and Aldana (2006) can be explained by the presence of the labor constraint.
Foltz and Aldana (2006) assumed that farm production is limited by the labor of the
operator, precluding access to hired labor. In a way this diﬀerence illustrates the impact of imperfect markets and the non-separability of consumption and production.
An imperfect labor market will make operators’ labor more valuable to the farm then
hired labor, which could result in either lower farm productivity or smaller farm size.
On the other hand, imperfect capital would make internal funds more valuable and
would likely result in an increase in the value of oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation.
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2.3

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed current trends in oﬀ-farm work among OECD countries and
presented the main factors inﬂuencing farm operators’ and households’ labor allocation decisions. It indicates that the farm sector is heavily inﬂuenced by the rest
of the economy. In particular, economic growth and technological development have
a strong inﬂuence in deﬁning farm and oﬀ-farm labor demands and farm structure.
As a result, no matter whether farm policy objectives focus more heavily on farm
households’ welfare, or on farm production and eﬃciency, it appears that the oﬀfarm sector has a role to play in determining the eﬃciency of the policy instruments
and the need for public intervention. It thus provides an argument to take oﬀ-farm
diversiﬁcation possibilities into consideration in the policy making process. However,
how to integrate oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation and the nonfarm rural economy in the policy
development remains an open question.
Properly deﬁned policy objectives would certainly help in improving our understanding of the interactions between the oﬀ-farm sector and farm policies. Taking
farm income stabilization as the central objective of farm policy, it appears that a
better understanding of the nature of farm income risks, the potential contribution of
oﬀ-farm income, and also the trade-oﬀs and constraints in terms of combining farm
and oﬀ-farm activities would be helpful. In particular, the relationship between oﬀfarm diversiﬁcation and eﬃciency appears to be of importance. Also, the potential
for a "crowding out" eﬀect between oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation and farm policy seems to
be a key factor in determining the impact of oﬀ-farm activities on farm programs.

c Simon Jette-Nantel 2013
Copyright 
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Chapter 3
Modeling the Impact of Oﬀ-farm Income on Farm Decisions

The previous chapter highlighted the key elements inﬂuencing labor allocation decisions and oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation. In particular, attention was given to the ﬁnancial
beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation in the farm context. A review of the literature showed that
the few theoretical models proposed to assess oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation beneﬁts did not
account for the presence of capital market imperfections. Yet, it was shown that part
of the argument explaining the incidence of oﬀ-farm work is that it can help mitigate the eﬀect of credit market imperfections by attenuating the impact of liquidity
constraints (Kwon, Orazem, and Otto, 2006; Blank and Erickson, 2007; Briggeman,
2011). This chapter proposes a model, borrowed from the consumption and ﬁnance
literature, which integrates capital market imperfections and labor allocation decisions, and thus provides a more accurate assessment of the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation.

3.1

A Review of Buﬀer Stock Saving Models

Most risk management studies in agriculture have focused on static models, mainly
using expected utility or mean-variance frameworks (e.g. Duncan and Myers, 2000;
Coble and Knight, 2002; Mahul and Wright, 2003; Barnett et al., 2005; Power, Vedenov, and Hong, 2009). This framework implies an ad hoc relationship between
consumption and income, precluding consumption smoothing. On the other hand,
standard dynamic portfolio models models (e.g. Merton,1969), rely on the assumption of perfect markets. In order to examine the interactions between farm risk
management programs and oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation, I chose to use a dynamic model
with imperfect markets. This is motivated by a desire to capture the impact of oﬀfarm work not only on production risk, but also on exposure to ﬁnancial risk and the
presence of capital market imperfections.
The modeling choice is guided by a number of theoretical results emanating from
the ﬁnance and macroeconomic literatures based on the buﬀer stock saving model
which is mostly attributed to Deaton (1991) and Carroll, Hall, and Zeldes (1992).
Under an assumption of imperfect markets and borrowing constraints, agents in these
models make consumption, investment and borrowing decisions in order to balance
the need for precautionary savings, their impatience for consumption, and the possibility of investing in risky assets. As a result, the approach provides a framework that
captures the value of a steady ﬂow of liquid labor income in smoothing consumption
and relaxing borrowing constraints. It also captures the impact of such income ﬂow
on investment incentives and insurance demand.
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The original paper of Deaton considered optimal consumption and savings in the
presence of labor income and one asset. Deaton’s buﬀer-stock model was intended
to capture the impact of borrowing constraints on consumption and saving behavior in an attempt to address some of the shortcomings of consumption models and
the apparent violation of the permanent income hypothesis. Further developments
of the model focused on the introduction of risky assets and portfolio choices (e.g.
Heaton and Lucas, 1997, 2001, 2002; Haliassos and Michaelides, 2003; Gomes and
Michaelides, 2005; Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout, 2005; Willen and Kubler, 2006).
This branch of literature shows that, in the presence of uncorrelated – or weakly
correlated – labor income and stock returns, buﬀer stock models predict an optimal
portfolio specialized almost exclusively in stocks (e.g. Heaton and Lucas, 1997, 2001).
Although this theoretical result is at odds with observed behavior, since most U.S.
households do not hold stocks, a number of model modiﬁcations that could account
for these discrepancies were oﬀered. These included the addition of stock market
participation costs (Haliassos and Michaelides, 2003; Gomes and Michaelides, 2005),
more realistic borrowing constraints (Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout, 2005; Willen and
Kubler, 2006), higher correlation between labor income and asset returns (Heaton and
Lucas, 2002), the possibility of catastrophic labor income shocks (Cocco, Gomes, and
Maenhout, 2005), or alternative utility speciﬁcation (Gomes and Michaelides, 2005).
But the main conclusion remained: when labor income is weakly correlated with
risky investment returns, the ﬂow of labor income acts as a substitute for a risk free
investment and increases the incentives to invests in risky assets.
The ﬁnite horizon version of the model, the life-cycle savings and portfolio model,
draws from the work of Merton(1969) and Samuelson(1969). These early studies
assumed perfect markets and did not include labor income. However, Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992) expanded Merton’s model by including labor income and
showed that the possibility of adjusting labor eﬀort and income ex-post increases the
demand for risky assets ex-ante. These results not only reinforce the idea that labor
income increases incentives to invest in the risky asset, but show that the possibility
to readjust labor income after lifting some of the investment uncertainty provides
further insurance beneﬁts even under perfect market assumptions. In fact, Merton’s
original portfolio rule can be modiﬁed to account for labor income. Merton’s rule can
be expressed as α = μ/((1 − ω)σ 2 ), which represents the share of wealth invested in
the risky asset (α) as a function of risk aversion (1 − ω) and risky asset’s expected
return and variance, μ and σ 2 . Including labor income leads to the expression:
αt = α ·

Wt + P V Yt
Wt

where Wt is the ﬁnancial wealth at time t and P V Yt is the present value of future
labor income (Cocco, 2005). This rule speciﬁes that if the discounted value of future
labor income is zero, i.e. P V Yt = 0 which implies that human capital no longer has
value, then Merton’s rule should be followed. But when the value of human capital is
positive, the share of wealth invested in the risky asset increases, i.e. αt > α. Hence,
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this rule explicitly accounts for the value of human capital and oﬀers an explanation
as to why younger investors will tend to invest more in risky assets.
Having established the impact of labor income on the optimal portfolio allocation, it becomes natural to expect that labor income will also aﬀect other risk related
decisions. The relationship between insurance demand and labor income under imperfect capital markets was investigated by Gollier (2003). His study showed that in
a life-cycle buﬀer stock model, demand for income insurance is much lower than in
a static model. The results showed that endogenous demand for insurance1 remains
limited to catastrophic risk, unless there is a binding liquidity constraint. These results strongly suggest that static models would underestimate the impact of labor
income on insurance demand and beneﬁts.
While most studies focused on wage earners, a few also considered the case of entrepreneurs, which is closer to that of farm operators. First, entrepreneurs’ income is
generally riskier and more closely correlated with stock returns, such that they have
less incentive to invest in equity markets compared to wages earners. Following the
human capital argument of Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992), Polkovnichenko
(2003) also argued that young entrepreneurs have a greater capacity to cope with
risks compared to their older counterparts because their human capital provides them
with greater ﬂexibility and limits the potential consumption shocks induced by business risk. Hintermaier and Steinberger (2005) added the presence of a persistent
idiosyncratic risk to entrepreneurs’ return on private equity and found that uncovering information about this shock led younger entrepreneurs to accept even greater
risk. The authors concluded that younger entrepreneurs hold an exit option that is
more valuable than that of an older entrepreneur, simply because of the time value
of their option. As such they are willing to undertake/accept greater risk in starting
a business.
On the other hand, entrepreneurs tend to invest most of their equity in their
own business. The preference of entrepreneurs for internal equity capital is likely to
limit entrepreneurs’ participation in public equity markets. The case is similar to
households who invest most of their equity in housing. In both cases, internal funds
may be preferred due to imperfect capital markets and the cost of debt. In a study
including housing equity, Cocco (2005) shows that, under imperfect markets, younger
and poorer investors have very little wealth to invest in stocks. Borrowing to invest
reduces greatly the potential beneﬁts of owning stocks, and housing price risk tend
to crowd out investment in other risky assets.
Extrapolating some of these theoretical implications to farm operators would suggests that, the negative correlation between farm income and the rest of the economy,
should increase incentives of farmers to invest in stocks. Also, younger farmers would
be willing to undertake greater ﬁnancial risk in starting a farm operation. But, at
1

Gollier (2003) assumed a 0.3 loading factor to derive his main conclusion.
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the same time, because farm operations are capital intensive and access to equity
capital remains limited in most cases, we could expect that most farmers – especially
younger ones – would not hold stocks, despite the potential diversiﬁcation beneﬁts
they represent. Furthermore, the aforementioned results, with respect to insurance
demand, would indicate that the beneﬁts from public risk management programs
would be much lower for operators with oﬀ-farm income. Not because they typically
operate smaller farms, or because they own a farm for non-business purposes, but
because their need for insurance products is lowered by the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of a
steady income ﬂow and the ﬂexibility that their human capital provides them.
In summary, the buﬀer stock model has shown to be an interesting framework in
explaining investment and consumption choices for a number of diﬀerent settings and
could oﬀer interesting insights regarding farming decisions, ranging from insurance
demand to entry and exit decisions. Admittedly, introducing market imperfections
makes these dynamic models much more complex than traditional expected utility or
mean-variance static models. From a farm modeling point of view, a key advantage of
such models is the capacity to capture the eﬀect of capital market imperfections and
to combine production and ﬁnancial risks within a single model, thus allowing agents
to endogenously balance the two sources of risk. The importance of this trade oﬀ
between ﬁnancial and production risk was highlighted by a few authors (e.g Gabriel
and Baker, 1980; Featherstone et al., 1988; Turvey and Baker, 1989) but most of the
empirical literature on farm income risk continues to ignore it. Even the few eﬀorts
just mentioned either fail to properly endogenize the trade-oﬀ between ﬁnancial and
production risk, or they ignore borrowing constraints and liquidity risk and thus underestimate the importance of ﬁnancial risk. The buﬀer stock model could ﬁll this
important gap.
Overall, I contend that buﬀer stock dynamic models provide a more thorough
and realistic characterization of the level of risk faced by farm operators. And, by
allowing operators to adjust labor allocation, they also include a more complete set of
risk management tools. By ignoring many of those aspects, a static expected utility
framework would likely understate the eﬀect of oﬀ-farm income on farm households
decisions and welfare. Hence, I consider such a dynamic framework as most appropriate to assess the impact of oﬀ-farm income on farm decisions and farm households’
welfare; and, consequently, most appropriate to assess the potential interactions between oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation and risk management provided through government
programs.

3.2

A Farm Level Buﬀer Stock Model

In this section a life-cycle dynamic farm management model including farm and oﬀfarm enterprises is deﬁned. As mentioned above, the key objective is to design a model
that will capture the ﬁnancial implications of oﬀ-farm income. The model borrows
various concepts from the buﬀer stock literature and adapts them to the farm context
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by incorporating various elements of the farm structure, such as economies of scale and
scope. The model also includes realistic borrowing constraints as well as an insurance
scheme that mimic the eﬀect of public risk management programs. In addition, the
model allows some labor allocation ﬂexibility by letting the agent choose to become,
or remain, a full-time farm entrepreneur, to adopt part-time oﬀ-farm employment,
or to exit farming altogether. This is done by solving the model over three diﬀerent regimes: full-time farming, part-time farming, and full-time oﬀ-farm employment.
The ﬁrst step is to model the operator and farm household consumption decisions.
It is assumed that farm operators are risk averse and maximize utility of consumption
(C) at time t ∈ [0, T − 1], which is deﬁned as:
U (Ct ) =

Ct1−ω
− I (Rt , Et ) SC
1−ω

where SC is a vector of transaction costs associated with changes in regime and
I (Rt , Et ) is an indicator function taking values of one when a regime switch has taken
place and zero otherwise. It is assumed that at any time farm operators can switch
either to part-time farming (E = 1), in which case they maintain their farm operation
and additionally earn some oﬀ-farm income, or they can switch to full time oﬀ-farm
work (E = 2) in which case they must abandon farming. The amount of oﬀ-farm
labor can only take a value θy in the case of part-time farming or one if the operator
exits the farming sector. As outlined by Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992), the
introduction of labor mobility provides further insurance beneﬁts.
In each case the mobility of labor in and out of the farm sector is assumed to
be reduced by the presence of transaction costs, and for simplicity we assume that
exiting farming is irreversible. The transaction costs SC can be thought of as representing both monetary costs linked to job hunting and training, and non-monetary
costs associated with a change in life style and forgoing some of the advantages of
"being your own boss". The presence of transaction costs can reﬂect the access and
propensity to work oﬀ the farm, which may inﬂuence farm decisions and investments.
These costs are likely to vary signiﬁcantly across the farm population depending on
personal preferences and operators’ access to oﬀ-farm jobs, which may in turn depend
on factors such as location, age and education.
Under the oﬀ-farm regime, the sources of income include labor income Y and
interest on stocks S and bonds B. Under the farm regime, investments in stocks and
bonds are still possible and it is assumed that the operator is either fully employed
by the farm operation or works part-time oﬀ the farm in which case he or she earns
a fraction θy = 1/2 of the full employment labor income Y .
Farm output (F ) is deﬁned as part of a multi-input multi-output relationship. The
objective of this approach is to include operators oﬀ-farm income (Y ) as an output,
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thus reﬂecting the potential interactions between farm and oﬀ-farm enterprises.2 The
function also captures the relationship between these two activities and a set of inputs
including farm capital (K), farm hired labor (H), variable costs (V C), and farmland
LD. The following translog distance function is used to model the multi-input multioutput relationship:
lnD = α0 + αf ln(F ) + αo ln(θy Y ) + . . .

1
... +
αf,f ln(F )2 + αo,o ln(Y )2 − 2αf,o ln(F ) ln(θy Y )
2
1
. . . + β ln(X) +
βk,l ln(Xk ) ln(Xl )
2


... +
γk,f ln(Xk ) ln(F ) +
γk,o ln(Xk ) ln(θy Y )
where X = [H, K, V C, LD] and D is a distance measure as deﬁned in Chapter 4.
It is well known that translog approximation of distance and cost functions are
not globally regular (Diewert and Wales, 1987; O’Donnell and Coelli, 2005), which
may cause trouble in ﬁnding a numerical solution. Although there exist alternative functional forms on which global curvature can be imposed, the estimation of
translog distance functions is more common and oﬀers some key advantages (Coelli,
2000; Kumbhakar, 2011). Therefore, regularity conditions are imposed locally in the
estimation of the translog distance function, such that regularity should hold over a
suﬃcient range to obtain a robust numerical solution to the dynamic model. Details
of the estimation procedure and results are presented in Chapter 4.
The farm gross output (F ) is then derived from the distance function and multiplied by a stochastic index including yield and market price variability. The stochastic
index is assumed to be a simple stochastic variable:
Pt = et ,

 ∼ N (0, σ )

Government payments take the form of a revenue insurance, similar to U.S. farm
program ACRE or the Canadian Agristability program. When farm revenues fall below a certain threshold, government payment takes a value deﬁned as a percentage of
the diﬀerence between the expected farm revenues and actual revenues. More specifically, it can be deﬁned as govt = f (Φ, t ), where Φ is a set of parameters deﬁning
program trigger and coverage levels. Then, an adjusted price per unit of farm output
capturing market revenues and government payment can be deﬁned as:

P gt = Pt + govt
2
Given the limitations of the data used to calibrate the model, it is assumed that spouse labor
allocation decision is not directly related to farm production.
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To reﬁne the analysis of the impacts of government subsidized risk management
programs, the payments are decomposed into two parts, a constant direct payment,
equivalent to expected payments; and fair-priced revenue insurance. The premium
for the insurance component is computed as:


π (Φ) =

f (Φ, t ) d

(3.1)

and the direct payment is


DP =





f Φ̄, t d − π̄

(3.2)

where π̄ represents the premium paid by farmers under current policy conditions,
and Φ̄ is the vector of parameters representing current policy triggers and payment
parameters. Therefore, policy parameters Φ can be changed without aﬀecting the
total support level and one can then evaluate the impact of either reducing only the
risk management component of current policy or reducing both the support and risk
management components.
For simplicity, stocks returns are deﬁned as a simple stochastic variable:
rs = r̄s + νt ,

ν ∼ N (0, σν )

and following the ﬁndings of Da-Rocha and Restuccia (2006) it is assumed that
farm income shocks and stocks are independent. i.e. Cov(ν, ) = 0.
Liquidity constraints
The impact of borrowing constraints on portfolio choices within life cycle models has
been analyzed by a number of authors. (e.g. Alvarez and Jermann, 2001; Cocco,
Gomes, and Maenhout, 2005; Davis, Kubler, and Willen, 2006; Willen and Kubler,
2006). Not surprisingly, borrowing constraints are found to aﬀect the ﬁnancial risk
households are willing to take. Much of the literature on life-cycle portfolio choices
seeks to explain participation in equity markets. It is found that the low participation
of households in equity markets could well be explained by the limited access and
increasing cost of borrowed funds, which reduce substantially the beneﬁts of equity
ownership. For example, the results of Willen and Kubler (2006) indicate that realistic borrowing constraints greatly reduce the beneﬁt of equity holding when one must
borrow funds to invest, and therefore attributes much greater value to liquidity than
does a standard model with unrealistic constraints such as a simple positive wealth
or solvency constraint.
Because the value of liquidity depends highly on credit constraints and leverage
capacity, imposing realistic constraints becomes important in attempting to value
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the stream of liquidity provided by oﬀ-farm labor income. Willen and Kubler (2006)
argue that borrowing constraints are more realistically reﬂected by cross asset restrictions. In other words, the possibility to hold a short sale position in one asset
should be conditional on holding a long position in other collateral assets. Willen
and Kubler (2006) make the case to restrict short sales of risky assets and make
short sales of riskless assets conditional on holding an appropriate long position in
risky assets, i.e. one can borrow an amount D at a constant rate if one also holds a
suﬃciently large position RA in a risky asset. Typically, we would require RA > D
to minimize solvency risk and the borrowing rate would decrease as θ = RA
increases.
D
Within this framework, the two extreme approaches often found in the literature can be represented as special cases. First, imposing short-sale restrictions (i.e.
D > 0) on all assets prevents borrowing altogether and ignores the possibility of using
assets to secure loans and get more favorable borrowing rates. On the other hand,
imposing a positive wealth constraint without regard for the positions in individual
assets amounts to assuming that θ = 1, and short sales are allowed for all assets. In
other words, all assets can be used as collateral for other assets and 100% of their
value is usable as collateral. This would amount to a very lax borrowing constraint
where the speciﬁc risk of each asset is not taken into account by lenders.
In the case of farm operations, one could consider investment in farm production
inputs as potential collateral that can be pledged for borrowed funds. Hence, given
some level of future farm income as collateral, a certain share of farm inputs can be
bought on credit. This is the typical operating credit that most farm operators use.
This constraint can be imposed either by limiting the quantity of credit available,
say D < θRA where D is the amount borrowed and RA is the total amount of farm
inputs and stock holdings, or by making the borrowing

rate an increasing function of
D
some proxy of the debt-to-asset ratio , e.g. r = g RA where g is a monotonically
increasing function. This latter approach is chosen based on the farm ﬁnancial standards (Miller et al., 1994). The interest rate function is deﬁned as:

rdebt = r0 + r1

1
1 + exp(κ1 ∗ log(κ2 RA
− 1)))
D

, ∀D > 0

(3.3)

Figure 3.1 shows the interest rate as a function of the debt-to-asset ratio. This
calibration shows that as long as the debt-to-asset ratio is less than 0.5 the rate increases at a fairly low pace reﬂecting the relatively low ﬁnancial risk to the lender.
But the rate increases much more rapidly thereafter towards a maximum rate of r̄.
One important implication of such a constraint is that it does not amount to a strict
solvency constraint since there is a possibility that the agent will end up in an insolvent position if the realized farm income is low enough. In such case the rate on
borrowed funds becomes r̄ if RA
≤ 1, i.e. the rate on unsecured debt.
D
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Figure 3.1: Interest rate on borrowed funds
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Budget constraints and state transition equation
Consumption of goods (C), investment in stocks (S) , and all farm inputs, including farm variable costs (V C), hired labor (H) farm capital (K) and land (LD), are
bounded below at zero. Land is assumed to be rented through cash rental agreements, thus eliminating the potential for capital gains on land and the use of land
as collateral. The budget constraint is balanced by variable B, which can represent
investment in bonds when positive and borrowed funds when negative. The budget
constraint is deﬁned as:
Bt = −Wt + Ct + V Ct + Ht + Kt + St + θy Y

(3.4)

This constraint states that borrowed funds must cover any consumption, farm
expenses, and stock investment exceeding wealth W . This constraint excludes land
rent, which is assumed to be paid at the end of the period. For each period, the
wealth Wt is deﬁned as the sum of farm and oﬀ-farm revenues minus all expenses,
including interest on borrowed funds intB as deﬁned by equation 3.3. In cases where
available funds exceed the sum of expenses, the surplus is assumed to be invested in
bonds at the risk free rate (r̃) < rs < r̄, such that
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rb =

rdebt ifB > 0
r̃
ifB < 0

(3.5)

Under the oﬀ-farm regime, all farm inputs are nil and the model boils down to
a simple buﬀer stock model with two assets and a deterministic labor income. For
simplicity, the model abstracts from the typical stochastic labor income proﬁle that
varies with age.

Wt+1 = P gt · F (Yt , V Ct , Ht , Kt , LDt ) . . .
+(1 − δ)Kt − intB + St rs − LDt · rent

(3.6)

Spousal income
As was mentioned in section 2.1, labor supply decisions of a farm operator depend in
part on the composition of the household and the labor supply decision of the spouse.
And there is some evidence that spouse labor allocation is related to farm income.
For example, in Midwestern states a number of spouses went to work oﬀ the farm
in response to the 1980’s farm crisis (Barlett, Lobao, and Meyer, 1999; Lobao and
Meyer, 2001). And this risk coping strategy may still be fairly common among large
crop farms, as this comment made in 2011 by a Kansas farmer would suggest: "most
of the larger farmers either have a wife working full-time who has a college degree,
or the wife is also running the combine and everything else on the farm" (Beach,
2013, p.222). This suggest that the spouse contributes to improve farm liquidity and
income by either reducing the cost of operation by substituting for hired labor, or by
bringing additional income from oﬀ-farm employment.
A simple modeling approach is to represent the household as a single decision
making unit where resources of all members are pooled and decisions are based on
aggregate consumption and labor supply. This would imply that the oﬀ-farm income
from a spouse would be included in Y in equation 3.6. Alternatively, the household
model can be disaggregated to account for the consumption, labor supply, and budget
constraint of each spouse. For example, a household model can be formulated as:
max

C1 ,C2

w1 U1 (C1 ) + w2 U2 (C2 )

s.t. C1 + C2 < Y1 + Y2 + M

(3.7)

where Yi is the income of spouse i and M is a common pool of wealth available for
consumption, and wi is the weight associated with utility of spouse i.
Following Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), this model can be reinterpreted as a single operator model given a budget constraint that includes a sharing rule h(Y1 , Y2 , M ):

29

max

U1 (C1 )

C1

s.t. C1 ≤ h(Y1 , Y2 , M )

(3.8)

1
A simple sharing rule can take the form 1+ϑ
(Y1 + ϑY2 + M ) , ϑ ∈ [0, 1], such that
when ϑ = 0 there is no sharing and the operator can consume all of his income and
wealth (C1 ≤ Y1 + M ), and when ϑ = 1 there is complete sharing and the operator
will consume half of total consumption, C1 ≤ 12 (Y1 + Y2 + M ).

Applying this rule to the budget constraint in eq. 3.4, we get a new constraint:
Bt = −Wt + Ct + V Ct + Ht + Kt + St + θy Y1 + ϑY2 + (1 + ϑ)C

(3.9)

which explicitly accounts for the contribution of spouse income to the budget constraint and also includes his or her consumption. The main advantage of this formulation is that it makes possible the comparison between diﬀerent sharing rules, and
thus between single operators and operators with a spouse working oﬀ the farm.3

Retirement value
Finally, it is assumed that the operator or household retires after T periods of operation and beneﬁts from the consumption of accumulated wealth WT . For simplicity,
the model abstracts from the potential pension beneﬁt related to oﬀ-farm employment. The utility in period T depends uniquely on accumulated wealth WT and the
retirement value RT is based on a preference parameter ρ,and a constant interest rate
of r̃ over N periods and is deﬁned as:

RT

= maxCT

N


ρi U (CT +i ) s.t.

i=0

N


CT +i
WT
=
i
1+ϑ
i=0 (1 + r̃)

⇒ CT +i = CT ((1 + r̃)ρ)−i/ω


N

((1 + r̃)ρ)−i/ω
WT
·
⇒ CT =
1 + ϑ i=0
(1 + r̃)i
WT
· Z(ρ, r̃, N, ω)
CT =
1+ϑ

RT =

N

i

ρi

−1

WT
· Z(ρ, r̃, N, ω) · ((1 + r̃)ρ)−i/ω
1+ϑ

1−ω

(3.10)

3
For simplicity, this formulation ignores leisure as a component of the utility function. If leisure
is included than the potential complementarity between spouse leisure time must also be taken into
account in the maximization of utility.
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Bellman equation
The resulting Bellman equation takes the form:


Vt (Wt , Rt ) = max

A∈A(S)

 ν 
Ct1−ω
− SC(Et , Rt ) + ρ
Vt+1 (Wt+1 , Rt+1 )
1−ω

(3.11)

and, given the budget constraint in eq. 3.9, we get the ﬁrst order conditions:
C −ω


= ρE VW (Wt+1 , Rt+1 )(P gt · FV C − 1)
1−ϑ


= ρE VW (Wt+1 , Rt+1 )(P gt · FH − 1)


(3.12)
(3.13)



= ρE VW (Wt+1 , Rt+1 )(P gt · FK − δ)

(3.14)



= ρrb E VW (Wt+1 , Rt+1 )

(3.15)



= ρE VW (Wt+1 , Rt+1 ) · rs

(3.16)

The relationship between ﬁnancial and production risk is deﬁned by the implied
relationship between the cost of debt (rb ) and the risk premium4 on farm inputs
as deﬁned by the covariance between future marginal value and current marginal
product of farm inputs:










rb (W, A) = E P gt · FV C − 1 + Cov P gt · FV C , VW (Wt+1 , Rt+1 )

(3.17)

Hence, increases in farm production risk will be reﬂected by a higher covariance
– in absolute terms – and will induce a decrease in the cost of debt, i.e. a reduction
in leverage and ﬁnancial risk. The diversiﬁcation beneﬁts of oﬀ-farm work and investment will be reﬂected in a lower covariance – in absolute terms – between future
marginal utility and farm income shocks, thus reducing the premium on farm input
marginal product and increasing the demand for farm inputs and investment.
Finally, the formulation as a regime switching model implies that certain conditions should hold at the switching point. Namely, the value-matching (eq.3.18) and
smooth pasting (eq.3.19) conditions imply that at the optimal switching point from
regime 1 to regime 2 (S∗1,2 ), the value under regime 1 should be equal to the value
in regime two minus switching cost SC1,2 , and the derivative of the value function
should be equal in the two regimes (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).

V1 (S∗1,2 ) = V2 (S∗1,2 ) − SC1,2


V1 (S∗1,2 )

=



V2 (S∗1,2 )

(3.18)
(3.19)

4
This term is closely related to the beta deﬁned in CAPM models. It is often referred to as the
consumption beta (Breeden, 1979; Romer, 2001)
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3.3

Conclusion

In summary, the model integrates a number of potential sources of ineﬃciency and
causes of resource misallocations that are thought to inﬂuence farm structure and its
performance. These include: farm income risk, imperfect risk and capital markets,
and some degree of labor immobility due to adjustment costs. Most importantly, it
also includes oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation as a mechanism that can potentially mitigate the
adverse eﬀect of some of those market imperfection on operators welfare and farm
eﬃciency.
Within this framework, the potential cost of incomplete risk markets are captured
by the potential farm household welfare loss induced by the variability of farm income,
including the potential of farm failure. At the aggregate level, another manifestation
of resource misallocation may be reﬂected in sub-optimal farm production levels. But
how this aﬀects aggregate farm production and its indirect economic impact is less
clear since unused inputs (e.g. land) would be used either by other operators or other
sectors. Hence, given the microeconomic nature of the model, the potential indirect
costs implied by changes in farm production and shifts of resources between sectors
are not included.
Nevertheless, this model can be used to explore the interactions between farm
revenue insurance programs and oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation and their impact on operators welfare as well as their farm production decisions. The availability and coverage
of farm revenue insurance programs is deﬁned by Φ̄. The parameters deﬁning accessibility and level of oﬀ-farm income for farm operators and households is deﬁned by:
1) the presence of a spouse working oﬀ the farm ϑ, 2) the presence of adjustment
costs SC, and 3) the level of oﬀ-farm income associated with full-time employment Y .
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3.4

Model Summary

State dimensions
1. W ∈ [0, ∞] - Wealth/Cash on hand
2. R ∈ {0, 1, 2} - Regime
Thus deﬁning the state variable S = W, R
Action variables and action space
The action variables are A = {C, V C, H, K, LD, B, St, E}, and the action space A(S)
is deﬁned by the following constraints:
1. Kt , Ct , Ht , V Ct , Stt ≥ 0
2. Et ∈ {0, 1, 2}
3. (1 + ϑ)Ct + Ht + Kt + V Ct + Stt − Bt = Wt + θy Y + ϑY2

State transition function
Wt+1 = P gt · F (Yt , V Ct , Ht , Kt , LDt ) . . .
+(1 − δ)Kt − intB + St rs − LDt · rent
Rt + 1 = Et

(3.20)
(3.21)

Reward function
f (A, S) =

C 1−ω
− SC(E, R)
1−ω

(3.22)

Bellman equation
The Bellman equation takes the form:


Vt (Wt+1 , Rt+1 ) = max

A∈A(S)



 ν 

f (A, S) + ρ

Vt+1 (Wt+1 , Rt+1 )

c Simon Jette-Nantel 2013
Copyright 
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(3.23)

Chapter 4
Farm Production and Oﬀ-Farm Diversiﬁcation: Empirical Estimation

The previous chapter developed a theoretical model that provides a framework to
assess the eﬀect of imperfect markets on farm labor supply decisions. The other important element that was discussed in Chapter 2 is the presence of a diversiﬁcation
premium that is thought to reﬂect the presence of farm labor and managerial constraints. The eﬀect of oﬀ-farm work on farm production will depend heavily on the
characteristics of the farm production technology. On the one hand, the presence of
economies of scale may increase the diversiﬁcation premium by preventing part-time
operators to achieve an eﬃcient farm size. Naturally, this will depend on the magnitude of economies of scale and the range of farm size over which these economies
might prevail. At the same time, the ability of operators to substitute other inputs for
their labor may dampen the impact of economies of scale on a potential diversiﬁcation
premium. However, other inputs, such as hired labor, may require managerial time
and skills which may also be constrained by oﬀ-farm work. On the other hand, the
presence of economies of scope, where operators may take advantage of downtimes on
the farm to work oﬀ the farm for example, could reduce the diversiﬁcation premium.
Given the important role these production technology characteristics are presumed
to play in deﬁning the cost of diversiﬁcation, this chapter is devoted to the empirical estimation of the production technology relating farm production and oﬀ-farm
work. Theoretically consistent estimates, to be used for the calibration of the model
presented in Chapter 3, are derived from a data set of commercial Kentucky grain
farms. The next section provides a short review of diﬀerent approaches found in the
literature to account for the impact of oﬀ-farm activities on farm production. It is
followed by the presentation of the econometric model, the data, and the estimation
results. A discussion of the results and their implications conclude the chapter.

4.1

Oﬀ-farm Work and Farm Production: A Literature Review

Production and eﬃciency estimation has a long tradition in agricultural economics,
although it often focused on the estimation of production and cost functions with
a single or aggregate farm output. However, the recent literature proposes a number of empirical frameworks to account for the impact of oﬀ-farm activities on farm
production. In some cases, the impact of oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation is embedded in the
measure of eﬃciency estimated by the model, while in other cases oﬀ-farm activities
are explicitly modeled as part of the production technology, providing estimates of
their impact on the productivity of inputs and economies of scale and scope.
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First, a review of the literature on the impact of oﬀ-farm work on farm activities
oﬀers mixed results, with some studies suggesting the presence of a diversiﬁcation
premium, while others ﬁnd no evidence of such premium. For example, an early
study by Bagi (1984) ﬁnds no evidence that part-time farmers in Western Tennessee
were less eﬃcient1 compared to full-time farmers. For small scale Norwegian farmers,
Lien, Kumbhakar, and Hardaker (2010) even found that a low level of oﬀ-farm income
would have a positive impact on farm production, but higher levels of oﬀ-farm work
would reduce productivity. The authors surmise that this eﬀect could be related to
the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of oﬀ-farm work and its positive impact on farm investment.
However, in a study of U.S. farms Goodwin and Mishra (2004) found that oﬀ-farm
work had a negative impact on farm eﬃciency, as deﬁned by the ratio of farm variable input costs to the value of farm production. Other studies based on U.S. farm
data (Paul et al., 2004; Paul and Nehring, 2005; Nehring, Fernandes-Cornejo, and
Banker, 2005) also conclude that farm operators and households with some oﬀ-farm
employment tend to be less eﬃcient in terms of farm production, but that accounting
for oﬀ-farm income as an output of the household increases their eﬃciency to a level
close to that of full-time operators. Their result also lends support to the presence
of economies of scale in farming and economies of scope between farm and oﬀ-farm
enterprises.
From a methodological point of view, this literature provides two main approaches
to empirically estimate the relationship between farm and oﬀ-farm enterprises. One
approach is to estimate the farm production function and the labor allocation decisions via a system of equations. Typically, a ﬁrst equation seeks to explain the
amount of labor allocated oﬀ the farm as a function of farm size and other household, operator and socio-economic characteristics while a second equation explains
the production of farm output enterprises as a function of farm inputs, oﬀ-farm labor
supply, and operators’ characteristics. This is the approach followed by Goodwin and
Mishra (2004) and Lien, Kumbhakar, and Hardaker (2010) among others.
Some drawbacks of this approach include the diﬃculties in identifying the system
of equations and the need to address censoring issues in the oﬀ-farm equation within
the context of simultaneous equation estimation. Goodwin and Mishra (2004) used
a Tobit model to estimate the oﬀ-farm labor supply, while the second equation consisted of a linear regression of farm operator characteristics and farm size variables on
a measure of farm eﬃciency. This framework provided an estimate of the relationship
between oﬀ-farm labor allocation and a proxy of farm eﬃciency (i.e. ratio of variable
costs to farm sales), but does not provide a detailed production function, nor does it
account for possible interactions between oﬀ-farm employment and inputs other than
variable costs.
1

Unless otherwise mentioned, eﬃciency in these models refers to economic eﬃciency of farm
operators. That is, their capacity to transform dollars of inputs into revenues. In most cases
revenues only included farm revenues.
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On the other hand, Lien, Kumbhakar, and Hardaker (2010) use a two-stage least
squares approach to estimate a farm production function, while accounting for the
impact of endogenous oﬀ-farm labor allocation decisions on farm eﬃciency. In this
case, identiﬁcation was made possible mainly due to the non-linearity of the stochastic
frontier equation used to estimate farm production. The drawback of this approach
is that the sample had to be limited to observations with oﬀ-farm work in order to
avoid censoring issues.
The other approach considers farm and oﬀ-farm enterprises as drawing from a
common pool of resources and, thus, as part of a multi-input multi-output production function. This approach was followed by Coelli and Fleming (2004), Paul et al.
(2004), Paul and Nehring (2005), and Fernandez-Cornejo, Nehring, and Erickson
(2007). In such cases, the production function, including farm and oﬀ-farm components, is estimated either via a distance function or a cost function, depending on
the availability of data and the behavioral assumptions one is willing to make. Both
distance and cost function approaches have the capacity to accommodate multiple
outputs and can provide estimates of economies of scale and economies of scope while
accounting for oﬀ-farm income as an output of the farm operator or household. In
the case of ﬂexible functional forms, they can also be used to estimate the potential
interactions between inputs and oﬀ-farm enterprises.
Compared to the cost function approach, the main advantages of using a distance
function is that it allows the modeling of multi-output and multi-input production relationships without having to rely on duality and behavioral assumptions of cost minimization, nor does it require price information (Fare and Primont, 1995; O’Donnell
and Coelli, 2005). The disadvantage, however, is that it may be more prone to endogeneity issues. Coelli (2000) and Kumbhakar (2011) provide in-depth discussions
of endogeneity issues in such models, with particular emphasis on the translog functional form. Most of these issues come from the use of stochastic frontier estimation,
which is usually employed to estimate distance functions. An important insight from
these articles is that particular care has to be given to what one considers as tenable assumptions about the data-generating process, e.g. whether the assumption of
cost-minimization or a proﬁt-maximization behavior is most appropriate. According
to Kumbhakar (2011), in the case of a translog input distance function under the
assumption of proﬁt-maximization, the endogeneity issue mainly focuses on output
terms while normalized input terms are unlikely to be correlated with the error term.
In this section, I follow the distance function approach to develop a multi-output
multi-input model estimated using the Bayesian approach proposed by O’Donnell and
Coelli (2005). The input distance is preferred to the output distance function since
the input orientation provides greater parameter ﬂexibility to estimate the interaction
with oﬀ-farm income. The model accounts for the production impact of oﬀ-farm activities as well as family, operator, and farm characteristics. In particular, the model
is designed to provide insights on 1) the trade-oﬀs between oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation
and farm eﬃciency, and 2) the substitutability between farm labor and farm inputs.
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The Bayesian estimation approach allows the imposition of regularity conditions
at each data point, a feature of great interest given that the estimated parameters are
to be used in a dynamic optimization model. At the same time, potential endogeneity
issues with output terms are acknowledged but the introduction of instrument variables within the Bayesian framework of O’Donnell and Coelli (2005) is left for further
research. An interesting contribution, however, is the treatment of zero-valued inputs
and outputs in the imposition of regularity issues, which draws from Battese (1997).

4.2

Distance Functions

The multi-output multi-input production function is estimated using a distance function. In the multi-output case, the input distance function can be expressed as:


DitI (xit , yit , zit ) = sup θ > 1 : yit ,
θ

xit
θ



∈ T (zit )

(4.1)

where xit , yit are the set of inputs and outputs, respectively, for farm household i
in year t. Where T is a technology set deﬁning the possible combinations of outputs
yit , and inputs xit , given the set of socioeconomic, demographic, and agro-climatic
characteristics zit . Hence, an input distance function estimates by how much the
input set could be contracted while maintaining the same output set.
Distance functions have been estimated for the farm sector (e.g. Coelli and Fleming, 2004; Paul and Nehring, 2005; Nehring, Fernandes-Cornejo, and Banker, 2005;
Fernandez-Cornejo, Nehring, and Erickson, 2007). A key aspect of the distance function is that, given a ﬂexible functional form, it can provide measures of economies
of scale and economies of scope between outputs. For example, Coelli and Fleming
(2004) used a distance function framework to estimate the economies of specialization
and diversiﬁcation between coﬀee and food production among smallholder farms of
Papua New Guinea. In a more closely related context, Paul and Nehring (2005) as
well as Fernandez-Cornejo, Nehring, and Erickson (2007) estimated distance functions using aggregated US farm data and provided estimates of economies of scale
and the impact of oﬀ-farm income on farm household eﬃciency.

Translog input distance function
The most common functional form for distance functions found in the literature is the
translog. It has the advantage of being a ﬂexible functional form, and given inputs
xit , outputs yit , and exogenous factors zit , the distance function is expressed as:
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ln Dit = β0 +
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βj ln xj,it +
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γnj ln xj,it ln yn,it + 0.5 ·

M
N 

n

j

βjk ln xj,it ln xk,it

k

αnm ln yn,it ln ym,it

m

φl ln zl,it + vi t

(4.2)

l

From this framework one can derive the eﬀect of exogenous factors (e.g. demographic or ﬁnancial factors) on eﬃciency, and also gather information on the relationships between inputs and outputs, including input shares, economies of scale,
economies of scope, and other elasticity measures.

Input elasticities and interactions
Interactions among inputs and between inputs and outputs depend on parameters
βij and γik . Negative (positive) input interaction terms βij indicate a some degree
of complementarity (substitutability), while negative (positive) input-output interaction terms γik indicate that input i favors (reduces) productivity in output k. The
degree of substitutability is, however, data dependent. The partial input and output
elasticities represent the percentage increase in distance(eﬃciency) due to a 1% increase in a particular input or output and, in the case of a translog function, they
are computed as:

s xj =
r yn =

∂ ln(D)
∂ ln(xj )

= βj +

∂ ln(D)
∂ ln(yn )

= αn +

K


βj,k ln(xk ) +

k
M


N


γj,n ln(yn )

(4.3)

n

αn,m ln(ym ) +

m

J


γj,n ln(xj )

(4.4)

j

From these input shares, a number of other elasticity measures can be derived to
characterize the input and output relationships (Youn Kim, 2000).
Economies of scale and scope
From a distance function, an appropriate measure of economies of scale can be deﬁned
by the scale elasticity as follows (Fare and Primont, 1995):


η

scale

= 

si

(4.5)

rn

Where η scale provides a measure of the percentage change in output due to a one
percent change in inputs, assuming that the input mix remains constant. In the case
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of an input distance function, homogeneity in inputs implies that

η scale = ( rn )−1 .



si = 1 so that

Using an input distance approach, Paul et al. (2004) report the presence of
economies of scale among U.S. farms. Results for output- and input-oriented distance functions for a similar pseudo-panel of U.S. farms are reported by Paul and
Nehring (2005). They also ﬁnd signiﬁcant economies of scale, although the estimated
elasticity of scale is lower when oﬀ-farm income is included in the model.
The output interaction terms (αi,j ) can also inform us regarding the relationship
among outputs. A positive interaction term indicates the presence of output jointness between output i and j. For example, positive estimates lead Paul and Nehring
(2005) to conclude that economies of scope exist between oﬀ-farm work and most
farm enterprises of U.S farms. However, the extent of economies of scope is data dependent, and Paul and Nehring (2005) did not report on the variation in economies
of scope within their data.
Finally, the impact of oﬀ-farm work on farm production can be measured by the
shadow output cost :
dF
ry · F
=−
dY
rf · Y

(4.6)

This can be interpreted as a measure of oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation premium since it
reﬂects the change in expected farm output due to a increase in oﬀ-farm output.

Regularity conditions
Production theory suggests that the distance function should satisfy a number of
regularity conditions (Fare and Primont, 1995; Coelli et al., 2005). An input distance
function should be:
1. homogeneous of degree one in inputs;
2. monotonically increasing in inputs;
3. monotonically decreasing in outputs;
4. concave in inputs;
5. quasi-concave in outputs.
The homogeneity in input condition is an artifact from the deﬁnition of the inputoriented distance function in equation (6). Since it measures the contraction of input
from the eﬃcient frontier, the distance must be linearly related to any rescaling factors aﬀecting the input mix. Monotonicity conditions simply state that higher inputs,
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and/or lower outputs, lead to higher input distance and thus a lower eﬃciency measure.
The concavity in inputs condition implies a diminishing rate of substitution among
inputs. Assuming rational input choices, competitive input markets and input divisibility, the concavity in input space of the distance function should hold. Similarly,
quasi-concavity in outputs would be required under rational choice, divisibility and
competitive output markets.
In practice, imposing all regularity conditions on the translog function has proved
to be technically diﬃcult and Diewert and Wales (1987) showed the existence of a
trade oﬀ between ﬂexibility and the imposition of regularity conditions. In fact, most
empirical analyses using translog functions have ignored some regularity conditions –
mostly monotonicity and curvature – and consequently failed to fulﬁll some of those
conditions (Coelli and Fleming, 2004; Paul and Nehring, 2005; Nehring, FernandesCornejo, and Banker, 2005; O’Donnell and Coelli, 2005; Sauer, 2006).
However, O’Donnell and Coelli (2005) provide a Bayesian estimation approach
allowing the imposition of all regularity conditions locally at each data point (or a
selected subset of data points), thus allowing the generation of coeﬃcient estimates
that are consistent with economic theory. Given the ultimate motive of the estimation eﬀort, which is to generate estimates that can be used in a simulation model,
the choice is made to use the O’Donnell and Coelli (2005) framework to explore the
impact of imposing regularity conditions in the estimation, to ensure that the estimated distance function will be well behaved and suitable for the simulation model.

Regularity and optimization conditions
The input distance function is the dual of the cost function. The cost function
is derived from a cost-minimization problem, and as such must satisfy ﬁrst- and
second-order conditions of such an optimization problem. The concavity in inputs,
as required by the input distance function, will also satisfy the second-order condition
associated to a cost minimization problem, although it falls short of imposing equimarginality between marginal value product and input prices. The relation between
cost-minimization and the input distance function can be expressed as :
C(y, w) = min w · x s.t. D(x, y) ≥ 1
x

(4.7)

Conversely, the output distance function would require convexity in output, which
would satisfy the second-order condition of a revenue-maximization problem. However, neither the input distance nor output distance regularity conditions are suﬃcient
to satisfy the second-order conditions of a proﬁt-maximization problem of the type:
max p · y − w · x s.t. D(x, y) ≥ 1
y,x
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(4.8)

Following Simon and Blume (1994, p.467), the second-order condition for such a
problem requires checking the sign of the leading principal minors of the bordered
Hessian2 :
⎡
⎤
O
−Dy
−Dx
⎥
BH = ⎢
⎣ −Dy λL Dyy λL Dyx ⎦
−Dx λL Dyx λL Dxx
The Bayesian framework of O’Donnell and Coelli (2005) can be modiﬁed to impose this condition on the estimation of the input distance function. Once again,
imposing this condition is motivated by the intent to use estimated parameters to
calibrate the dynamic model in which the farm operator solves a proﬁt-maximization
problem.
As shown in Appendix A, this condition does not preclude the presence of economies
of scale. It amounts to imposing decreasing marginal returns. The monotonicity
condition only requires that producers are not in stage III of production (Doll and
Orazem, 1984), while the second-order condition of the proﬁt-maximization problem
limits the producer to operate under decreasing marginal return to inputs, which may
occur in part of stage I and throughout stage II of production.

Zero-valued entries and regularity conditions
When some observations have zero-valued entries, as is the case with the data used in
this dissertation since many observations have zero oﬀ-farm income, it is problematic
for the translog form (or the Cobb-Douglas special case) since the log of zero is undeﬁned. Some common strategies to deal with zeros in log-linear models are 1) to drop
observations with zeros, or 2) to zero out the log entries by replacing the zeros with
ones, or 3) to impute some small values to replace the zeros. The appropriateness
of each approach often depends on the data and the cause of data censoring. When
too many zeros occur in the data the cost of dropping observations quickly becomes
prohibitive. On the other hand, if the imputation approach is favored then the choice
of the small value to be imputed can aﬀect the results and should be made with care.
In the case of a production or distance function, observing an input level of zero
is contrary to the nature of a translog or Cobb-Douglas production function, since it
should imply an output of zero. Imputing ones or small values to replace the zerovalued observations could be an option. But when considering the monotonicity and
curvature conditions, this approach is not fully satisfying. In fact, replacing the zerovalued observations with the assumption that a very small amount of input is being
used may lead to signiﬁcant increase in the range of data covered, thus reducing the
ﬂexibility of the translog function tremendously (Diewert and Wales, 1987).
2

The last n−k leading principal minors should alternate in sign with the largest principal leading
minor of the same sign as (−1)n where n is the size of BH and k is the number of constraints ( 1 in
this case)
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However, following Battese (1997), zero-valued observations can be interpreted as
an indicator of diﬀerent technologies being available to producers, and thus can be
though of as diﬀerent models. In this approach, dummies are used to discriminate
among models which leads to a clear answer on how to treat zero-valued observations
in imposing regularity conditions. The distance function is then expressed as:

ln Dit = β0 +

J


βj ln xj,it +

j

+αf ln Fit +

J


J 
L
K

1
βjk ln xj,it ln xk,it +
φl ln zl,it
2 j k
l

γf j ln xj,it ln Fit +

j

⎛

+λit ⎝βy +

J


αf f
(ln Fit )2
2

β̃j ln xj,it + α̃f ln Fit + αy ln yit

j

+

J

j

⎞

αyy
(ln yit )2 + αf,y ln Fit ln yit ⎠ + vi t
γyj ln xj,it ln yit +
2

(4.9)

Where, λit is the dummy variable indicating whether or not oﬀ-farm income is
zero-valued for observation i in time t. Implicit in this formulation is the assumption
that the technology used by operators with oﬀ-farm employment is comparable to
the one used by full-time operators, such that higher order coeﬃcients (βjk , γf j ) are
the same for both functions.
However, the coeﬃcients (βy , β̃j , α̃f ) allow for diﬀerence in linear coeﬃcients between the two regimes. This is done mainly to facilitate estimation by using normalized (demeaned) data. Supposing that parameters β̃j , α̃f , and βy are all set to zero,
then equation 4.9 would be the same when λ = 0 and y = 1 , implying that there is no
diﬀerence between the case without oﬀ-farm income, and the case of average oﬀ-farm
income. Allowing these parameters to take non-zero values provides estimates of the
diﬀerence between those two cases. While β̃j is a simple shift parameter, to capture
diﬀerence in distance between the two cases, α̃f , and βy can be used to test whether
there are changes in the eﬀect of inputs and farm output between the two cases.
Deriving the regularity conditions with respect to equation 4.9, monotonicity conditions are expressed as:
s xj

= βj +

K
k

rF = αf + αf,f ln(F ) +
ry







≥0

(4.10)

γf,j ln(xj ) + λ (α̃f + αf,y ln(y)) ≤ 0

(4.11)

≤0

(4.12)

βj,k ln(xk ) + γf,j ln(F ) + λ β̃j + γy,j ln(y)
J
j

= λ αy + αyy ln y +

J
j

γy,j ln(xj ) + αf,y ln F



The Hessian deﬁning the concavity in input remains unchanged. In the case of
full-time farms, the distance function has only one output and quasi-concavity in
output is implied by monotonicity in output (Simon and Blume, 1994). In the case of
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part-time farms, quasi-concavity in output can be deﬁned either based on the Hessian
or bordered Hessian (Morey, 1986).

4.3

Data and Variables

The model is estimated using data from 94 farm operations participating in the Kentucky Farm Business Management(KFBM) program between 1998 and 2010. The
KFBM data include thorough budgeting and ﬁnancial statements information for
farm businesses and operators. While it does not provide a random sample, the
farms included in the data set are representative of typical commercial farms within
Kentucky (Kentucky Farm Business Management Program, 2009). Consequently,
using this data set provides an opportunity to investigate the presence of a diversiﬁcation premium and economies of scale among commercial farms, which are the focus
of stabilization programs.
The data provides information for each operator and for each farm operation.
Operators’ records are used in this study since they contain the information about
oﬀ-farm income. Operators’ records also include information on their contribution
to farm activities in the form of farm revenues, costs, and assets and liabilities. But
this provides only partial farm information when multiple operators are involved for
a particular farm. Hence, the sample used is limited to the farms with a unique
operator.
The sample was also chosen based on geographical and farm type criteria to be
relatively homogeneous in terms of production patterns, and representative of commercial grain farms of Western Kentucky. Hence, only grain farms3 located in the
western part of the state and for which grain revenues accounted for at least 60%
of total farm revenues are used. This selection process generated a sample of 523
observations covering 94 grain farms between 1998 and 2010. The summary statistics
for the key variables are presented in Table 4.1
The output and input variables were deﬁned based on the requirements of the
simulation model developed in Chapter 3. Output variables include: 1) gross farm
revenues, including crop and livestock sales, changes in inventories, and other farm
income, and 2) oﬀ-farm employment income excluding interests and dividends. Input
variables include: hired and family labor, farm capital, quality adjusted farmland,
and other variable costs.
Hired labor is the amount in dollars of paid labor during the year plus the value
of family labor excluding the operator. It is assumed that each operator provides a
3

Grain farms are deﬁnes by KFBM as " farms on which the value of feed fed was less than 40
percent of the crop returns and the value of feed fed to dairy was less than one-sixth of the crop
returns." (Kentucky Farm Business Management Program, 2009)
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ﬁxed amount of labor and management, which can then be allocated either to farm or
oﬀ-farm activities. Capital is measured based on the market value of the total stock
of machinery and equipment, breeding livestock, and buildings and improvements at
the beginning of the year. It is assumed that the ﬂow of capital used during a year
is a function of the total capital stock. Variable costs include costs such as seeds,
chemicals, and fuel. To avoid double-counting inputs, variable costs exclude cash
rent paid for land, machine hire, and hired labor, as these are covered by other input
variables.

Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Full Sample
Part-Time only
Mean Std. Dev.
Mean Std. Dev.
Operators with OFI>1000 (%)
9.9
n/a
Oﬀ-farm income($)
3,041.7
10,891.2
33,777
16,107
Farm Revenues($)
673,306
568,547 316,105
220,493
OFI/Farm gross revenues(%)
n/a
n/a
19.6
21.9
OFI/NOFI*(%)
n/a
n/a
126.6
472.4
Hired labor(%)
43,837
48,696
22,503
38,099
Variable costs($)
403,205
313,450 227,863
157,166
Capital($)
487,193
396,074 250,961
105,599
Land owned (acres)
395
469
228
171
Land Operated (acres)
1,560
1,074
1,056
662
Current Ratio
3.86
8.75
2.76
7.48
Debt-to-Asset ratio
0.39
0.22
0.44
0.23
ROA
6.30
8.21
3.19
6.43
Age
50.6
10.4
51.4
8.9
Household size
2.95
1.42
3.08
1.05
Crop Revenues (%)
0.83
0.13
0.77
0.09
Land under Crop Share (%)
0.37
0.28
0.42
0.28
Land under Cash rented (%)
0.32
0.26
0.24
0.22
Rented acres (%)
0.69
0.24
0.66
0.23
*Net operating farm income is computed as: gross farm income minus variable
costs(excluding rent) and hired labor. Hence, it provides a measure of return to
land, capital, and management.

Land tenure
An important source of heterogeneity in the KFBM data is land tenure. As can be
seen from Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2, most farms in the sample rent a large share of the
land they operate, and the rental agreements seem to vary a lot among farms, with
some renting exclusively through crop sharing agreement, others exclusively through
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cash rent, and many having a combination of both. This is not really surprising, but
it does have an impact on the information reported within the KFBM data set.
Under cash rental agreements, revenues will be handled in the same way as under
land ownership, but variable costs will include the cash rent paid for land services.
On the other hand, revenues from land under crop sharing agreements will be deﬂated signiﬁcantly, since the share belonging to the landlord will not be included in
the records. And, in some cases, variable costs will also be deﬂated if landlords are
covering part of those costs. And, ﬁnally, owned land will not show anywhere in the
income statement, other than through interest paid on mortgage loans, if there are
any.
To make all farm operations more comparable, and account for land service as an
input to the farm production process, we include total acreage operated as an input,
assuming that land service is a linear function of soil quality adjusted acreage. The
soil quality measure used is the soil quality index reported in the KFBM data. Cash
rent is then excluded from variable costs to avoid double counting for land inputs.
Similarly, adjustments are made to account for crop sharing agreements. First,
variable cost are adjusted for the cost covered by the landlord which is available from
the KFBM data4 . Crop revenues are also adjusted to account for the fact that a share
of revenues goes to landlords. It is assumed that under most crop share agreements,
1/3 of the crop revenues goes to the landlords. Hence, given information about the
total acreage and acreage under crop sharing, and assuming that crop return on crop
shared land is similar to return on other land, adjusted crop revenues C̃rev is computed
as follows:


Crev



θ
= π LDoperated (1 − )
3

C̃rev = πLDoperated
Crev
=
1 − θ/3
where Crev is the observed crop revenues, θ is the share of land under crop sharing agreement for a given observation, and π are revenues per acres assumed to be
constant for all acres of a given farm in a given year.

Farm and operator characteristics
In addition to the input and output variables, the model also includes a number
of demographic and ﬁnancial characteristics. A time variable is also included in the
4
For observations reporting crop sharing, KFBM data provide an estimate of "leasing cost" which
is meant to capture the cost covered by landlords.
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Figure 4.1: Land Tenure
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Figure 4.2: Rental Agreements
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model to capture any trend in farm eﬃciency. The age of the operator is also included
in linear and quadratic terms. These two variables can be seen as a proxy for farming
experience and human capital. It is expected that human capital would increase
production levels and eﬃciency, but at a decreasing rate. However, human capital
variables have been found to be mostly insigniﬁcant in previous empirical studies
using distance functions (e.g. Paul et al., 2004; Paul and Nehring, 2005; FernandezCornejo, Nehring, and Erickson, 2007).
Other studies have found evidence of a liquidity constraint aﬀecting production
choices (Bierlen et al., 1998; Hart and Lence, 2004; Kwon, Orazem, and Otto, 2006).
To control for possible impacts of liquidity on production choices and eﬃciency, the
current ratio at the beginning of the year is also included in the model. Paul and
Nehring (2005) also included a solvency measure, the debt-to-asset ratio, and found it
to be insigniﬁcant for the output distance and to have a negative impact on eﬃciency
for the estimated input distance function. The eﬀect of such a variable on eﬃciency
might, in fact, be ambiguous. Highly eﬃcient farms have incentives to leverage their
equity, leading them to have high debt-to-asset ratios. On the other hand, less eﬃcient
farms may also have a high ratio, not because they are trying to leverage their equity
but rather because they have low proﬁtability and diﬃculties in paying back their
debt. To discern between these two cases, we include the debt-to-asset ratio at the
beginning of the year through an interaction term with the return on asset. One
would expect this interaction term to have a positive eﬀect on productivity.

Operators reporting oﬀ-farm income
The sample includes 48 observations reporting an operator oﬀ-farm income higher
than $1000. For the majority of these operators, oﬀ-farm income is a non-trivial
source of income. On average, oﬀ-farm income is larger than their net operating farm
income and represents almost 20% of gross farm sales. The median also indicates
that for 50% of these operators, oﬀ-farm income represents more than 76.2% of their
net operating farm income.
Operators reporting oﬀ-farm income tend to operate smaller farms, present signiﬁcantly lower measures of proﬁtability(ROA), and appear to be more liquidity constrained as indicated by their lower liquidity ratio. A natural explanation would be
that these operators are beginning farmers, with less experience, highly leveraged
capital structures, and facing ﬁnancial constraints. However, the operators reporting oﬀ-farm employment in this sample do not appear to diﬀer from the rest of the
sample in terms of age, or household size. Another potential explanation would be
that these operators diﬀer signiﬁcantly in terms of ﬁnancial management strategy and
objectives. As implied by the buﬀer stock model developed in Chapter 3, oﬀ-farm
income is expected to reduce exposure to ﬁnancial risk and would allow the farm
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operator maintain lower farm liquidities or, as suggested by Blank (2005), to support
investments providing illiquid returns such as capital gains on farmland.

4.4

Econometric Model

Since distance D is unknown, for estimation we can rearrange the input distance
function Di as follow
− ln x1it = β0 +

J


βj ln x∗j,it +

j

+αf ln Fit +
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− ln x1it = βXit + γXYit + αYit + φZit + vit + ui

(4.13)

where * indicates inputs that are normalized by the numeraire input x1 . This
transformation is possible given the homogeneity of the distance function in inputs,
which implies that θD(y, x) = D(y, θx). Equation 4.13 is obtained by letting θ = x11
and transferring the eﬃciency term to the right hand side. The last line represents
a more compact formulation where vit is a standard error term while ln Di = ui ≥ 0
provides a measure of the distance and technical eﬃciency, Di ≈ T Ei−1 = eui .
The model is estimated as a random eﬀect model following the Bayesian approach
developed by O’Donnell and Coelli (2005). In this framework, the random variable
ui is assumed to follow an exponential distribution with parameter λ. The standard
error term vi is assumed to follow a normal distribution centered at zero and with
variance h−1 .
This Bayesian framework allows the imposition of the regularity conditions discussed earlier, by deﬁning the prior p(β) ∝ I(β ∈ R) for the parameter values β, where
I is an indicator function which takes the value one if β ∈ R and zero otherwise, and
R is the set of permissible parameter values under a given set of regularity conditions.
The prior p(h) ∝ h−1 is used for the variance of the standard error term and, following
O’Donnell and Coelli (2005), the proper prior p(λ−1 ) ∝ fG (λ−1 |1, − ln(τ ∗ )) is used as
the parameter of the gamma distribution of ui .5 Parameter τ ∗ is the prior median of
the eﬃciency distribution which we set to 0.9 based on eﬃciency parameters reported
5

fG (a|b, c) indicates that a follows a the gamma distribution with parameters b
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in previous literature (Paul et al., 2004; Paul and Nehring, 2005; Fernandez-Cornejo,
Nehring, and Erickson, 2007).
The joint prior is then:


p β, h, u, λ−1



= p(β) p(h) p(u|λ−1 ) p(λ−1 )
∝ I(β ∈ R) fG (λ−1 |1, − ln(τ ∗ ))

N


fG (ui |1, λ−1 )

i=1

And the likelihood function is :


p y|θ, h, u, λ−1




h
∝ hn/2 e(− 2 (y−βX−γXY−αY−φZit −u) (y−βX−γXY−αY−φZit −u))

where θ = {β, γ, α, φ}.
The goodness of ﬁt of the diﬀerent models are tested using the deviance information criteria (DIC) proposed by Spiegelhalter et al. (2002).This measure includes a
measure of goodness of ﬁt based on the log likelihood and a measure of complexity
reﬂecting the number of free parameters. Speciﬁcally, the DIC is measured as:
DIC = goodness of ﬁt − complexity
= 2 · log(p(y|θ̄)) − 4 · E [log(p(y|θ))]
4.5

(4.14)
(4.15)

Estimation Results

Parameter estimates are presented in table 5.1. These estimates are obtained by
sampling from the posterior distribution using the Gibbs sampler and MetropolisHastings algorithm deﬁned in O’Donnell and Coelli (2005). Results for each model
are based on 50,000 draws with a burn in of 10,000 draws. Model 1 is the base
unconstrained model, while curvature and monotonicity in inputs and outputs are
imposed on model 2. Model 3 also imposes the second-order condition related to
the assumption of proﬁt maximization. Hence, model 2 would be consistent with
standard economic theory, but does not impose any proﬁt maximization behavior.
On the other hand, model 3 is consistent with a framework where operators optimize
total farm and oﬀ-farm income.

Model comparison and goodness of ﬁt
Table 5.1 reports the DIC calculated based on equation 4.15. Unsurprisingly, the DIC
identiﬁes the unconstrained model as providing the best ﬁt, followed relatively closely
by model 2 and 3. The relatively modest increase in the DIC induced by regularity
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and optimization constraints can suggest that these conditions are not rejected by
the data, although the unconstrained model violates many of them.
Table 4.3 provides a summary of the violations of the regularity conditions in
the unconstrained model. The monotonicity conditions are respected in most cases,
but violations of quasi-concavity in output and concavity in inputs are much more
common. As could be expected, imposing these regularity conditions comes at a cost
in terms of goodness of ﬁt and will aﬀect some of the coeﬃcient estimates, elasticity
measures, and eﬃciency estimates derived from the model.
Table 4.2 shows that the main diﬀerence between model 1 and 2 is the magnitude
of input interaction parameters which tends to be much lower when regularity constraints are imposed. Given that most violations relate to second-order conditions, it
is to be expected that most changes in estimates will aﬀect second-order terms. For
example, the interaction term between variable input and oﬀ-farm income (γV C,Y ) is
much larger in model 1, implying that oﬀ-farm work would lead to a much larger increase in the importance of variable inputs in farm production. Only the parameters
βK,K and βH,H change sign when imposing regularity conditions.
Parameter estimates from model 2 and 3 appear much closer with the exception
of parameters αf and αf,f . In fact, the main impact of imposing a proﬁt maximization second-order condition is to reduce economies of scale by shifting the linear and
quadratic parameter related to farm output. All other parameters are similar although their signiﬁcance is altered in some cases.

Farm and operator characteristics
Looking at the coeﬃcient estimates on farm and operator characteristics, age is found
to have a negative linear impact on eﬃciency while family size has no signiﬁcant impact. The estimates on farm ﬁnancial characteristics are signiﬁcant and of expected
signs. The current ratio estimates implies a negative relation between liquidity constraints and farm production. On the other hand, high return-to-asset and debt-toasset ratios would be linked to higher eﬃciency levels, likely reﬂecting farms that
can eﬀectively leverage their equity. On the other hand, either low return-to-asset
or low debt-to-asset ratio would be linked to lower eﬃciency. Also, over the 1998 to
2010 period there appears to be a clear positive trend in productivity for Western
Kentucky grain farms.

Part-time operators
The model presented in equation 4.13 allows for diﬀerences in linear parameters between part-time and full-time operators. First of all, the constant associated with
part-time operation β̃dy1 would suggest a slightly lower eﬃciency for part-time oper-
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Table 4.2: Parameter Estimates
Parameters
β0
βdy1
αY
αF
α̃F
βH
βV C
βK
β̃H
β̃V C
β̃K
βH,H
βH,V C
βH,K
γH,Y
γH,F
βV C,V C
βV C,K
γV C,Y
γV C,F
βK,K
γK,Y
γK,F
αY,Y
αY,F
αF,F
†
βLD
†
β̃LD
†
βH,LD
βV† C,LD
†
βK,LD
†
βLD,LD
†
γLD,Y
†
γLD,F
φage
φf amsize
φcurr.ratio
φROADA
φyear
DIC

Model 1
0.1269
-0.0189
-0.0324
-0.7905
-0.0730
0.0588
0.4809
0.1521
0.0218
-0.0552
0.0439
0.0233
0.0327
0.0024
-0.0538
-0.0125
-0.1611
-0.0928
0.3518
0.0294
0.1093
0.2466
0.0254
-0.0605
-0.1924
-0.0017
0.3083
-0.0105
-0.0584
0.2211
-0.0189
-0.1438
-0.5446
-0.0423
-0.0010
0.0016
0.0038
0.0192
0.0154
22.79

**

**
**
**
**

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

**
**
**
**
**
**
**

**
**
**

Model 2
0.1536
-0.0590
-0.0828
-0.8190
-0.0978
0.0233
0.5279
0.1133
0.0129
0.0220
0.0864
-0.0011
0.0086
-0.0030
-0.0002
-0.0015
-0.0715
0.0161
0.1054
0.0257
-0.0079
0.0241
0.0023
-0.0079
-0.0816
-0.0296
0.3355
-0.1213
-0.0045
0.0468
-0.0052
-0.0370
-0.1293
-0.0265
-0.0019
-0.0011
0.0037
0.0203
0.0190
25.78

†

**
**
**
**
**
**
**

*
**
*

*
**
**

**
**
**
*

**
*
**
**
**

Model 3
0.0324
-0.1000
-0.0605
-0.9447
-0.1312
0.0282
0.5722
0.1341
0.0169
-0.0353
0.1045
-0.0012
0.0090
-0.0037
0.0001
0.0016
-0.0621
0.0112
0.0759
0.0362
-0.0095
0.0223
0.0075
-0.0036
-0.0295
-0.1331
0.2655
-0.0861
-0.0041
0.0419
0.0020
-0.0399
-0.0982
-0.0453
-0.0019
0.0040
0.0043
0.0219
0.0243
27.53

**
**
**
**
**
**
**

**
**
**

**
**
**

**
**
*

**
**
*
**
**
**

Indicate the parameters derived from the homogeneity property of the distance function..
** Indicate that Pr(β<0|y)<0.05 for positive estimates and Pr(β>0|y)<0.05 for negative estimates.
* Indicate that Pr(β<0|y)<0.1 for positive estimates and Pr(β>0|y)<0.1 for negative estimates.
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Table 4.3: Violation of regularity conditions in Model 1
Monotonicity in hired labor
Monotonicity in variable costs
Monotonicity in capital
Monotonicity in land
Monotonicity in Farm revenues
Monotonicity in Oﬀ-farm income
Quasi-Concavity in outputs
Concavity in inputs

Violation rate*
16.8%
1.05%
7.20%
2.12%
0.01%
19.09%
25.04%
70.36%

N K
*Violation rates are based on E[violation] = n k violationn,k dkdn where N=523 is the number
of observations in the data, K=40,000 is the number of draws from the posterior distribution, and
violation=1 if the constraint is violated and zero otherwise.

ators. The constrained models also imply that farm production requires more inputs
when working oﬀ the farm (α̃f < 0). The exact relationship between oﬀ-farm work
and farm production depends, however, on other interactions’ terms and is best summarize by graphing farm production under various input levels.
Figure 4.3 shows the farm production for input levels covered by the data and
for a full-time operator (Y=0) and a part-time operator (Y=$16,500). All models
imply only small diﬀerences between part-time and full-time operators when the level
of inputs is low. However, when input levels increase above the KFBM data mean
(e.g. 1500 acres for land input), the unconstrained model would imply that part-time
farmers can produce more farm output than full-time operators, which is counter
intuitive. Imposing regularity constraints generate a production pattern much more
sensible as part-time operators become less eﬃcient in farm production at high input
levels.
As will be discussed later, the main diﬀerence between model 2 and 3 is the presence of signiﬁcant economies of scale, even for very large farms. But results from
both constrained models imply that part-time operators may hold a very slight farm
production advantage when operating on less than 1000 acres, but ﬁnd themselves at
a disadvantage on larger farms.
Linear input terms (β̃) and cross input and output terms (γ) also indicate some
diﬀerences in input productivity under full and part-time operations. This is reﬂected
in ﬁgure 4.4 which displays the marginal product of each input under the two regimes.
In particular, capital and hired labor appear more productive under part-time operations as their input share and marginal products are expected to be higher under
part-time operations. On the other hand, variable inputs and land appear more productive for full-time operators.
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Most interaction terms among inputs βi,j are not signiﬁcant with the exception
of inputs’ own quadratic terms (e.g. βH,H ) which suggest some modest diminishing
returns and the interaction between variable inputs and hired labor βH,V C which indicates some degree of substitution between
  these two inputs. Finally, interaction
terms between inputs and farm output γ f suggest that, as farm output increases,
land productivity tends to decrease more rapidly than other inputs.

Figure 4.3: Farm production
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Figure 4.4: Marginal Farm product of Inputs (Model 3)
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Economies of scale
Figure 4.5 indicates that, among this sample of Western Kentucky commercial crop
farms, many farms experience economies of scale. Model 26 implies fairly important economies of scale, which persist as farm size increases. Imposing the secondorder condition linked to an assumption of proﬁt maximization reduces the extent of
economies of scale, such that the model estimates diminishing returns for farms with
more than $1.5 million in farm sales.
A few reasons can cast doubts on the high level of economies of scale estimated in
model 2. First it must be noted that input distances have been reported to overestimate economies of scale compared to an output distance measure (Paul et al., 2004).
7
Second, the conventional wisdom is that economies of scale are mostly attributed
to the livestock sector while they remain much more limited in the crop sector (e.g.
Chavas, Chambers, and Pope, 2010; MacDonald, O’Donoghue, and Hoppe, 2010;
Schnitkey, 2012). Finally, as will be discussed later, for the input distance function
the estimated economies of scale appear to be closely related to the implied level of
eﬃciency for operators of larger farms. High estimates of economies of scale seem to
imply low levels of technical eﬃciency for larger farms and vice versa.
Further investigation reveals that the extent of economies of scale also depends
in part on the input and output mix of any given farm. In particular, more intensive
use of variable costs would appear to increase the level of economies of scale, while
more intensive use of land would reduce it 8 . Also, part-time operators experience
lower economies of scale. According to Figure 4.6, most operators working oﬀ the
farm are facing lower degrees of economies of scale. This might be explained by the
greater constraint imposed on operator’s labor and management induced by higher
levels of oﬀ-farm work. It thus implies signiﬁcant trade-oﬀ between farm expansion
and oﬀ-farm work.
In fact, there appears to be a clear negative relationship between farm and oﬀfarm operation. Both the constrained and unconstrained models suggest that some
degree of diseconomies of scope exist between farm and oﬀ-farm activities, as indicated by the negative sign of the estimated parameter αY,F . This result is at odd with
previous results of Paul and Nehring (2005). A few hypotheses can be put forward
to explain the discrepancy with their results. On the one hand, this may be due
to violation of regularity conditions in Paul and Nehring (2005) results since they
neither checked nor imposed those conditions. Alternatively, this may be due to the
diﬀerence in the data. Paul and Nehring (2005) used pseudo-panel data from the
6

Model 1 is not shown in ﬁgure 4.5 but implies even greater levels of economies of scale compared
to Model 2 and 3
7
As reported in Appendix B, an output distance function estimated using the KFBM data
yields apattern of estimated returns to scale that follows closely the pattern of Model 3 with high
economies of scale for smaller farms and decreasing economies of scale for larger ones.

scale
8
The impact of input xi on the elasticity of scale can be computed as ηiscale = ∂η∂xi = j γi,j .
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ARMS dataset which covers the entire U.S. and includes a large number of smaller
"non-commercial" farms. The lack of economies of scope in the KFBM data estimates
may reﬂect greater diﬃculties in accessing suitable oﬀ-farm employment among Kentucky operators compared to the rest of the country, or it may be that the results
of Paul and Nehring (2005) were driven in large part by non-commercial and smaller
farm operators which are not represented in the KFBM data.
Figure 4.7 reports the shadow output cost calculated using equation 4.6, which
measures the change in gross farm revenues induced by an increase in oﬀ-farm income
while holding input and distance(eﬃciency) constant. The upper panel of Figure 4.7
shows that the opportunity cost of oﬀ-farm income is quite low for smaller farms,
making it proﬁtable to diversify oﬀ the farm. The shadow output cost of oﬀ-farm
work increases with the size of the farm operations, although most of the larger farms
still display a shadow cost close to one. This would suggest that operators of larger
grain farms are eﬀectively paying a diversiﬁcation premium to work oﬀ the farm.
The lower panel shows that lower shadow output cost coincide with higher levels of
oﬀ-farm income.

Eﬃciency
The technical eﬃciency obtained from the output distance function are presented in
ﬁgure 4.8. It seems that most farms are relatively eﬃcient with more variation found
among operators of smaller farms. The decision to work oﬀ the farm does not seem
to aﬀect eﬃciency as some part-time operators are found among the most eﬃcient of
the entire sample. And larger farms do not appear to be systematically more eﬃcient
than their smaller counterparts. In fact, model 2 estimates suggest that operators
of very large farms are among the most ineﬃcient. Considering the stark contrast
between model 2 and 3 in terms of economies of scale, it seems that for larger farms
models either estimate large economies of scale with coeﬃcient of technical eﬃciency
that decrease with farm size, or constant return to scale and comparable eﬃciency
between operators of small and large farms.

4.6

Implications and Conclusions

Using farm level panel data from Western Kentucky grain farms, the impact of oﬀfarm diversiﬁcation on production and eﬃciency was estimated using an input distance function on which diﬀerent theoretical restrictions are imposed. Overall, the
results are in line with the ﬁndings reported in the literature in various ways. First,
estimated eﬃciency coeﬃcient and elasticities diﬀer substantially between constrained
and unconstrained models, much like the results reported by Sauer (2006). The unconstrained model implies that as farm size increases, part-time operators becomes
more eﬃcient than full-time operators. This is a rather counterintuitive result that is
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Figure 4.5: Economies of Scale (Model 2 and 3)
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Figure 4.6: Economies of Scale (Model 2 and 3)
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Figure 4.7: Shadow output cost
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Figure 4.8: Eﬃciency (Model 2 and 3)
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3000

reversed once regularity conditions are imposed. Hence, the results presented above
reiterate the importance of obtaining theoretically consistent estimates.
For farm operators of smaller commercial farms, the constrained models imply
that oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation has little to no negative impact on farm production efﬁciency. In fact, these model estimated a slightly positive impact for smaller farms.
However, for larger farms oﬀ-farm work has a clear negative impact on farm production eﬃciency. These results are in line with previous literature(Lien, Kumbhakar,
and Hardaker, 2010; Paul et al., 2004; Paul and Nehring, 2005; Fernandez-Cornejo,
Nehring, and Erickson, 2007), although the focus on commercial farms implied by
the nature of the sample used in this study diﬀers markedly from previous studies
which included a large share of non-commercial. Hence, the results presented here
imply that economies of scale extend beyond the smaller non-commercial farms and
up to the smaller commercial farms.
Besides the impact on farm production eﬃciency, the estimates also suggest that
hired labor and capital inputs have a greater importance for part-time operators. The
implied marginal product of these inputs is higher for part-time operators, suggesting
that they may act as substitutes for operators labor. On the other hand, variable
inputs and land appear less productive under part-time operation.
In the end, the estimated models indicate that part-time operators experience
lower levels of economies of scale, while full-time operators enjoy economies of scale
at least until they reach 1500 acres in size. This suggest a certain trade-oﬀ between
oﬀ-farm work and on-farm expansion. Overall, the diversiﬁcation premium related to
oﬀ-farm work appears to be relatively small for Kentucky grain farms with less 1500
acres. Beyond that, the diversiﬁcation premium would increase signiﬁcantly although
more detailed information about the impact of oﬀ-farm employment on larger farms
is scarce given that no part-time operators in the KFBM data operated on more than
2000 acres.
An interesting contrast between model 2 and 3 is the degree of economies of scale
faced by full-time operators which diﬀers markedly between the two models. The
high degrees of economies of scale in model 2 are compensated by low technical efﬁciencies, while the reverse is true for model 3. Hence, it appears that assumptions
about the data-generating process may have important implication for the results.
Similar conclusions were reached by Kumbhakar (2011) when exploring the potential
for endogeneity issues in the estimation of distance function. It is a possibility that
the apparent bias in the economies of scale estimates based on input distance function, which was also reported by Paul et al. (2004), would ﬁnd its origin in some of
the potential endogeneity issues highlighted by Kumbhakar (2011).
Finally, other limitations inherent to the data must be kept in mind when generalizing those results. The KFBM data are said to be representative of Kentucky
commercial farms, and thus do not represent the entire farm population. In addition,
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the subsample selected consists only of grain farms operated by a single operator.
The impact of oﬀ-farm work on farm with multiple operators and other farms types
such cattle or dairy farms may be diﬀerent.

c Simon Jette-Nantel 2013
Copyright 
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Chapter 5
Numerical Analysis

To assess the impact of oﬀ-farm income on farm decisions and welfare, and its potential in mitigating the adverse eﬀect of farm income risk, the dynamic model presented
in section 3 is solved numerically under diﬀerent scenarios. The model can be used
to explore the interactions between farm revenue insurance programs and oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation and their impact on operators’ welfare as well as their farm production
decisions.
Within the model, the availability and coverage of farm revenue insurance programs is deﬁned by the parameters Φ̄. The parameters deﬁning accessibility and level
of oﬀ-farm income for farm operators and households is deﬁned by: 1) the presence
of adjustment costs SC if operators choose to exit farming, 2) the diversiﬁcation of
operators’ own labor through part-time operation E = 1, and 3) the presence of a
spouse working oﬀ the farm ϑ = 1. In this section, the impact of each of these components on the adverse eﬀect of farm income risk is explored.
Because policy concerns may vary from distortions in farm production to lower
operators’ welfare, the impact of oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation on these diﬀerent variables
is explored. More speciﬁcally, the impact of diversiﬁcation and insurance programs
on farm production is deﬁned by the impact on the risk premium on farm inputs
(eq. 3.17). This premium represents the distortion induced by risk on resource allocation. Naturally, the welfare of operators is capture by the value function (eq. 3.23).
The chapter starts by presenting the calibration of the model. It is followed by the
introduction of the model solution under certainty and a comparison of the optimal
solution with farm statistics from Kentucky. The analysis under uncertainty follows
and is conducted in three steps. First, the impact of adjustment cost on optimal
behavior is presented to assess the value and impact of labor mobility and improved
access to oﬀ-farm labor markets. Then an analysis of the impact of operators’ labor
diversiﬁcation on farm revenue insurance eﬀect is presented. Finally, the impact of
spouse income sharing is addressed.

5.1

Model Calibration

For the purpose of the simulation, farm production parameter values are derived from
the KFBM data for the most part. First, the estimates from model 3 are selected to
parameterize the distance function presented earlier, which deﬁnes the relationships
between farm inputs, oﬀ-farm work and farm production. Despite the lower ﬁt of
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the model as indicated by the DIC in table 5.1, model 3 has the advantage of being
theoretically consistent with the framework deﬁned by the dynamic model. In fact,
the choice between model 2 and 3 can be seen as a choice between two potential explanations of the KFBM data. The ﬁrst one, represented by model 2, is based on the
presence of substantial economies of scale which only decrease mildly over the range
of farm sizes included in the data. However, operators of larger farms are found to
have substantially lower coeﬃcients of technical eﬃciency compared to most small
farm operators. On the other hand, model 3 implies that operators of the largest
farms display a similar level of eﬃciency compared to operators of smaller farms, but
are facing modest diseconomies of scale.
Parameterization of the dynamic model using model 2 estimates would have to be
accompanied by strict acreage or credit constraints. Absent of any constraint, model
2 would imply that an eﬃcient farm operator could take advantage of substantial
economies of scale and would then have incentives to grow his farm without limits
to take advantage of the increasing returns to farm inputs. If either tight credit constraints or limits on available acreage is imposed to avoid unabated farm expansion,
the solution is then deﬁned primarily by these constraints while risk considerations
only have a marginal impact. On the other hand, model 3 implies increasing return to
scale only over a limited range of smaller farms. Larger farms face decreasing return
to scale such that the solution of the dynamic model becomes much less dependent
on exogenous constraints. It also allows comparisons of part-time and full-time operators with the same level of technical eﬃciency, letting the interactions between
oﬀ-farm work and farm production implied by the parameters deﬁne the solution in
each case.
Farm revenue variability is set at σ = 0.125 based on the variance of the residual
of the estimated distance function. Land rent is set at $85 per acre based on information from Halich, Pulliam, and Lovett (2010), USDA (2009), and the KFBM data.
Depreciation on farm capital is set at 10%, which is also in line with the 1998-2009
KFBM data.
The risk free interest rate (r̃) is set at 1% based on the average real rate for the
U.S. one-year treasury bills between 1997 and 2009 1 . The interest rate proﬁle for
borrowed funds deﬁned in equation 3.3 and ﬁgure 3.1 is based on an unsecured debt
rate of 20%, an average debt-to-asset ratio slightly above 10% (Harris, 2010), and an
average nominal cost of capital of 9% and 7% within the 1997 and 2006 ARMS data
(Shleifer and Vishny, 2012).
Farm revenue insurance is introduced as a fair premium insurance covering gross
farm revenues losses, and is similar in nature to programs in place in the U.S. and
Canada. For this analysis, the parameters deﬁning government payments (Φ) are set
1

The nominal interest rate was deﬂated using the annual percentage change in CPI index.
Interest data taken from The Federal Reserve and CPI data from Bureau of Labor Statistics
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to approximate the USDA ACRE program 2 using the simplifying assumptions that
the farm and state benchmark yields are the same and the state and farm ACRE
guarantees are also equal. More speciﬁcally, government payments are deﬁned as:


govt =

Φ1 · min [−t , 0.25] if t < −0.1
0
otherwise

(5.1)

where Φ1 is the maximum insurance coverage available. In the following section results are presented for coverage levels varying from 0% to 80% of the revenue loss.
Following previous literature (e.g. Gomes and Michaelides, 2005; Willen and Kubler,
2006) the expected return to stocks is set at 5% with a standard deviation of 15%.
Finally, the utility parameter is hypothetically set at ω = 4.25, with a discount rate
of 0.925 implying a rate of time preference of 8.11%. The transaction cost incurred
when exiting the farm sector or choosing part-time farming are set in function of the
utility parameters. Under baseline parameter values, low adjusment costs are set to
1/2 and high adjusment cost are set at 1.

Table 5.1: Parameters
Parameter
ω
ρ
θy
r̃
r̄
κ1 , κ2
σ
σν
rs
N
T
φ
ψ
β, α, γ, D
rent
δ

Description
utility parameter
time preference
oﬀ-farm labor share
risk free interest rate
interest rate on unsecured debt
parameter of interest function
volatility of farm gross revenues
volatility of stock returns
expected return on stocks (rs )
number of retirement periods
number of production periods
government programs parameters
regime switching adjustment costs
distance function parameters
land rent per acre
depreciation rate

Value/range
4.25
0.93
0.5
0.01
0.20
{5,1.5}
0.125
0.15
0.05
25
25
see equation 5.1
1/2,1
see Table 5.1
$85 per acre
0.1

Finally, the model is solved by backward recursion using an approximant for the
value function ( equation 3.23) which is deﬁned over the state space S using cubic
splines. The value function in period T is deﬁned by the retirement value (equation
2

See Paulson (2009), and Farm Service Agency for references.
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3.10) and a solution for the value function at time T-1, (VT −1 ) is found by ﬁnding
the optimal policy at each node of the states space grid using the optimization rouR The operation is repeated until t=1. The distribution of
tine fmincon in Matlab.
shocks ν and  are approximated using Gaussian quadrature as deﬁned within the
Compecon toolbox (See Miranda and Fackler, 2004).

Part-time and full-time operators under certainty
The ﬁrst analysis is performed under certainty to provide a comparison of the optimal solution deﬁned by the calibrated model with the KFBM data. It also provides
a comparison of part-time and full-time operators with respect to their production
eﬃciency and optimal production choices. The scenarios deﬁning full-time and parttime enterprises are presented ﬁrst, followed by their comparison.

Full-time operation Under this scenario, oﬀ-farm employment is available only if
the operator exits the farm sector. Hence, part-time operation is not accessible for the
operator and it is assumed that there is no spouse, or that the spouse is not working
on or oﬀ the farm. This could represent a case where suitable oﬀ-farm employment
is unavailable within the vicinity of the farm, such that exiting the farm operation
and relocating elsewhere to ﬁnd an oﬀ-farm job is the only employment alternative
to the farm operator. Under this scenario, the adjustment costs related to farm exit
would be relatively high. The impact of these adjustment costs is explored later in
this section by solving the dynamic model under two diﬀerent levels of transaction
costs.

Part-time operation In this scenario, full-time farming is precluded, leaving the
operators to choose between part-time farming or exiting the farm sector to ﬁnd
oﬀ-farm employment. The model is calibrated using the same parameter values as
before. However, in this case the parameters of the distance function which deﬁne
the relationship between oﬀ-farm work and farm production will be of importance.
They will in fact deﬁne the potential eﬃciency cost of working oﬀ the farm, and the
optimal changes in the input mix. Parameters of the distance function implies that
economies of scale are more limited for part-time operators. In addition, part-time
operators face large diﬀerences in the production share of inputs. In particular, parameters indicate that part-time operators will favor a more intensive use of capital
(β̃K = 0.10) and will get less productivity out of land (β̃K = −0.11).

Comparing production and eﬃciency
The optimal production decisions of part-time operators reﬂect an input mix biased
towards more intensive capital use (Figure 5.1) suggesting substitution of capital for
67

labor. The model generates capital input levels slightly above the average of the
KFBM data ($333/ac.), while the levels of variable inputs are below the average of
the KFBM data ($265/ac.).3 The maximum level of debt per acre is similar between
the two types of operations, but it decreases much more rapidly for part-time operators as equity increases. This is a reﬂection of the limit on the optimal farm size
imposed by the diversiﬁcation of labor oﬀ the farm. The lower panel of Figure 5.2
shows the optimal acreage. With an equity of about $500,000, the maximum optimal
acreage for part-time operators is achieved at about 1,400 acres. By contrast, for
full-time operators the optimal acreage reaches 3,100 acres. This diﬀerence reﬂects
the lower economies of scale under the part-time regime, which curtail farm expansion
possibilities. Another implication is that investment in stocks also occurs at lower
levels of equity for part-time operators, leading to lower levels of ﬁnancial risk.

Figure 5.1: Optimal Production under certainty
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The calibration of the model also implies that overall part-time operators will
choose a less intensive production approach, as reﬂected by the lower farm inputs
3

University of Kentucky Cooperative Extension (2005) estimate variable costs between $140/ac.
to $250/ac. depending on crops, and depreciation charges between $30/ac. to $40/ac.
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and output per acre (Figure 5.2). Only when operators’ equity is below $500,000
does the intensity of production of full-time operators decreases to a level similar to
part-time operators. This is mainly due to the presence of economies of scale and
credit constraints.

Figure 5.2: Optimal Farm Production under certainty
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Figure 5.3 compares diﬀerent measures of proﬁtability and welfare for part and
full-time operators. The top panel shows that farm return on assets (ROA)4 is slightly
higher for full-time operators, which is consistent with the KFBM data ( see Table
4.1).
The second panel reports the return on equity (ROE)5 with and without oﬀ-farm
income. This measure of proﬁtability also tends to be slightly higher for full-time
4

The return on assets is computed as the net farm income plus interest on borrowed funds
divide by farm assets. In this case, farm assets include capital (K), hired labor(H) and variable
costs (V C). Net farm income plus interest is deﬁned as: (F · (P g − π) − V C − H − δK − LD · rent)
5
The return on equity is computed as the net income divide by operators equity (W ). Net income
is deﬁned as ((P g − π) − V C − H − δK − LD · rent − rb B + rs S + θy Y ). This measure reﬂects the
return on farm operators equity including human capital.
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Figure 5.3: Proﬁtability of Farm level under certainty
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operators. When including oﬀ-farm income, part-time operators have a higher ROE
than full-time operators at levels of equity below $500,000. Within the KFBM sample
of grain operators presented in Chapter 4, about one third had less than $500,000 in
equity.
The apparent advantage of part-time operation at lower equity levels is also reﬂected in the welfare of operators under certainty. At equity levels below $400,000, the
welfare of part-time operators is higher but, abstracting from farm income variability,
it becomes advantageous to switch to a full-time operation as equity increases. The
optimal switching point depends on the proﬁtability of the farm operation relative
to other investment opportunities and oﬀ-farm wage. For example, results presented
in Appendix D shows that operators with lower levels of eﬃciency may never ﬁnd it
optimal to switch to a full-time operation. Also, the decision to move to a full-time
operation may depend on the presence of adjustment costs. These may include the
loss of pension and health care beneﬁts for example. Hence, the beneﬁts of each
regime may be aﬀected by a number of factors not reﬂected in standard measures of
proﬁtability like ROE.
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Obviously, risk and uncertainty will aﬀect the production and diversiﬁcation
choices of operators and households. This will be explored below. Yet, this comparison under certainty suggests that, when focusing on farm production of commercial size enterprises, full-time farm operations are more proﬁtable and produce more
intensively, generating higher demand for farm inputs per acre and higher outputs.
These implications of the calibrated model are inherited from the KFBM data which
display similar trends. Naturally, increases in farm income risk will negatively affect welfare as well as farm production and proﬁtability. And this negative impact
will presumably be larger for full-time operators than for those working oﬀ the farm.
Then, the policy question is whether the negative impact of risk on farm decisions
and welfare of full-time farm operators is larger than the cost imposed by the diversiﬁcation premium.

5.2

Full-time Operation and Adjustment Costs

Under full-time operation, the introduction of farm income risk generally leads to the
typical risk responses. Welfare decreases, the expected rates of return on asset and
equity decrease, and the presence of a positive risk premium on farm inputs leads
to a reduction in input demand and farm output. Figure 5.4 shows the impact of
introducing farm income risk on farm production decisions while Figure 5.5 shows
the impact on proﬁtability and welfare.
However, the introduction of capital and labor market imperfections and the presence of economies of scale induce a change in response around the farm exit point.
The smooth pasting and value matching conditions (equation 3.18 and 3.19) ensure
that at the switching points the value and marginal value will be the same under each
regime. However, the shape and curvature of the value function are altered, leading
to a reduction in the degree of risk aversion, and potentially to risk neutral or even
risk loving behavior near the switching point. This occurs despite the risk aversion
implied by the utility function. For example, in the bottom panel of ﬁgure 5.5, the
value function for the low adjustment costs scenario is no longer concave at values of
equity near $200,000.
This change in curvature implies that the marginal value of equity may increase
at an increasing rate when approaching the switching point. This is because additional equity will allow an operator to maintain the farm operation and avoid the
adjustment costs associated with farm exit. Hence, the marginal value of equity is
a lot higher at, or near, the switching point than it is at other points suﬃciently far
above, or below, it.
This behavior is induced in part by imperfections in the capital market. If capital
markets were perfect, even operators with little or no equity may be able to obtain
the necessary funds ( presumably through equity ﬁnancing) to maintain the farm
in operation at reasonable costs, and thus the prospect of having to face farm exit
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Figure 5.4: Optimal Production Decisisons under Uncertainty
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and adjustment costs, or to have to operate at an ineﬃcient scale would be heavily
discounted. This behavior is also induced by the presence of economies of scale over
a range for smaller commercial farms, and the potential costs and diﬃculties involved
in diversifying labor oﬀ the farm. If farming involved constant or decreasing returns
to scale even for these smaller farms, and if operators had perfect ﬂexibility in their
labor allocation decisions, i.e. they could freely adjust the number of hours of oﬀ-farm
work, then instead of exiting the farm sector and facing adjustment costs operators
would simply downsize the operation and diversify their labor oﬀ the farm as needed.
As a result, the presence of economies of scale in combination with imperfect capital
and labor markets can have profound eﬀects on the optimal risk response implied by
the model.
The impact of this behavior is best exempliﬁed by looking at the risk premium on
farm inputs over a range of equity. Figure 5.6 shows the optimal expected marginal
value product (MVP) of variable farm inputs. The dark line shows the optimal MVP
under certainty, reﬂecting the impact of credit market imperfections on the cost of
debt. As equity increases, the excess return on input converges to its opportunity cost
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Figure 5.5: Proﬁt and Welfare under Uncertainty
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of 5%, determined by the expected return on stocks. The ﬁgure also shows the optimal expected MVP under uncertainty and two diﬀerent levels of adjustment costs.
As deﬁned by equation 3.17, the diﬀerence between the cost of debt and expected
MVP is the risk premium6 . The risk premium is depicted in ﬁgure 5.7, including the
eﬀect of farm income insurance. It clearly shows the non-monotonic relation between
the risk premium and equity. Below the switching point, there is no demand for farm
inputs and the premium is not deﬁned. As equity increases above the swicthing point,
the premium actually increases as the behavior of operators is less and less driven by
the downside risk imposed by credit constraints and, potential costs of farm exit. As
equity further increases, the value function becomes concave and we ﬁnd the traditional risk return trade-oﬀs, implying a decreasing premium as equity increases.
6
See Appendix C for more details about the nature of the risk premium and its relation with
risk aversion and precautionary saving motives.
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Figure 5.6: Marginal Value Product of Variable Input
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Figure 5.7: Risk Premium on Farm Variable Inputs
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Farm revenue insurance
An important policy implication of imperfect markets and economies of scale is that
changes in insurance beneﬁts will also be non-monotonic with respect to operators’
equity. As shown in ﬁgure 5.7, the introduction of farm income insurance induces a
substantial decrease in the risk premium. This eﬀect is most pronounced for operators with $500,000 to $1,000,000 in equity. But operators with less equity will have
little incentive to increase their demand for farm inputs and expand production. In
the limit, because fairly priced insurance also reduces the upside risk, it could even
lead credit constrained operators to reduce their demand for farm inputs.
Other farm inputs behave in a similar fashion to variable inputs, although the
magnitude of the risk premium is lower for capital inputs since their return is amortized over a number of years. Since farm income risk is modeled as a short-term
shock without persistence, returns to capital becomes less volatile. Introducing shock
persistence would increase the risk premium on capital inputs. Also, the impact on
debt-to equity is presented in ﬁgure 5.8. In low equity states, insurance programs have
very little eﬀect on optimal levels of ﬁnancial risk as measured by the debt-to-equity
ratio. However, as equity increases the insurance does reduce the precautionary motive of operators leading to higher optimal levels of farm inputs and ﬁnancial risk.

Figure 5.8: Debt-to-Equity ratio under diﬀerent levels of insurance coverage
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While the risk premium is a key indicator for policy aiming at reducing the negative aﬀect of risk on farm input demand and production, it does not directly reﬂect
the changes in welfare. The welfare beneﬁts of insurance programs are summarized
by changes in the value function. Figure 5.9 shows that at equity levels below the
exit point there is no insurance beneﬁt since it is optimal to leave farming altogether.
Immediately above the critical equity level, insurance beneﬁts start to increase with
equity. For those with barely more than $200,000 in equity, insurance is simply not
enough to reduce the probability of farm exit signiﬁcantly. As equity grows, farm
revenue insurance becomes an increasingly eﬃcient tool in reducing the potential of
farm exit, thus making it more valuable. Naturally, at some point insurance becomes
less valuable for wealthier farmers as they accumulate enough wealth to reduce their
level of ﬁnancial risk signiﬁcantly.

Figure 5.9: Welfare under diﬀerent levels of insurance coverage
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Farm exit/adjustment costs
The possibility to leave the farm can be viewed as a switching option where the cost
of exercising this option is the farm exit cost. Naturally, the beneﬁts of easier access
– or the value of the option – depends on the probability of exit in future periods and
the cost of exercising the option. Hence, the value of easier access to labor market
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is highest for states where farm exit is higher and nearer in the future. As a result,
the impact of changes in adjustment costs on operators welfare remains bounded to
lower equity levels and only overlaps with farm revenue insurance over a limited range.
The bottom panel of Figure 5.9 shows that reducing adjustment costs as an eﬀect of
similar magnitude compare to 40% insurance coverage, but the eﬀect is distributed
towards very low equity operators. Hence, access to oﬀ-farm income acts more like
catastrophic insurance.
As such, easier access to oﬀ-farm employment would appear more as a complement to farm revenue insurance programs, especially when payments are capped to a
maximum amount, as is the case with ACRE. Nevertheless, reducing the adjustment
cost associated with oﬀ-farm employment does aﬀect farm decisions. Figure 5.7 shows
that by reducing the downside risk, the lower adjustment cost also reduces the risk
premium on farm inputs.
Like other options, the value of the option provided by oﬀ-farm employment opportunities depends on time to maturity, i.e. time before retirement, and the probability
of it being exercised which depends on the level of equity and the proﬁtability of
switching to oﬀ-farm employment. This option lessens the downside risk faced by
operators, eﬀectively making them less responsive to farm income risk and decreasing the beneﬁt they derive from insurance. Because the option is most valuable for
younger and less wealthy operators, their behavior is most aﬀected by easier access
to oﬀ-farm labor markets.
Because the value function in period one represent the discounted sum of utility,
changes in value in period 1 summarize the total change in welfare induced by insurance and adjustment costs. The impact of a change in adjustment cost on farm
production decisions through the operators life-cycle can be illustrated with simulation results. Figure 5.10 shows that under low farm exit costs, the average change
in variable input induced by maximum coverage insurance is around 2% less for the
ﬁrst 10 years. This gap lessens as operators approache retirement. This is in part
because the probability of leaving the farm decreases with time since the precautionary motive has led operators to accumulate equity. In some instances where adverse
schocks prevented them from building savings, operators exited the sector. Lower
adjustment costs lead to higher exit rates, but those that remain in operation derive
less beneﬁt from farm insurance.
Hence, access to an oﬀ-farm labor market can provide a valuable option to farm
operators, especially when young and/or less wealthy. This could lend support to the
long held view that oﬀ-farm income serves as a transition tool allowing young farmers
to enter the farm sector and facilitating farm transfers. Not only does working oﬀ
the farm facilitate farm entry but the mere possibility of transferring to an oﬀ-farm
occupation at a later date helps younger operators shoulder the business risk associated with farm entry.
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Figure 5.10: Changes in Expected Variable Inputs
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Also, the results presented here are based on changes in the cost of farm exit,
which may represent monetary costs involved in job search, training, or relocation,
and non monetary costs. But changes in the oﬀ-farm wage would have a similar eﬀect
on the value of the oﬀ-farm option. Hence, factors aﬀecting either farm exit costs
or oﬀ-farm wages, such as age, education and location, may all play an important
role in deﬁning the downside risk facing farm operators and in turn aﬀect their farm
decisions.
Under increasing labor market integration, the probability of farm exit increases.
But it should also lead younger and/or less wealthy operators to 1) have a lower demand for insurance, 2) have more incentives to intensify or expand farm production
and 3) have the capacity to accept greater ﬁnancial risk. To the extent that access
to oﬀ-farm labor market depends on distance from important urban agglomerations,
one could conclude that insurance programs are therefore of lesser importance for beginning farmers with higher education and who are established in peri-urban areas,
and are of greater importance for those in remote areas.
Lower adjustment costs increase labor mobility thus providing a valuable option
to operators in case of farm failure, but also ensuring an eﬃcient use of resources
and contributing to the diversiﬁcation of rural economy. This increased mobility that
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has erased inequality between farm and nonfarm households also contribute to rural
development and reduces the adverse eﬀect of farm income risk on producers’ welfare
and farm income decisions.

5.3

Part-time Farming Under Uncertainty

Given reported results in the literature stating that diversiﬁed labor income reduces
the role of insurance (e.g. Gollier, 2003), it is easy to surmise that oﬀ-farm employment will lessen the impact of insurance programs on farm production decisions and
operators’ welfare. At the same time, results under certainty presented above have
exposed some of the downside of part-time operation in terms of lower farm eﬃciency
and production intensity. While the adverse eﬀects of risk is expected to be lower,
the question is whether the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation can oﬀset its downside so as to
make it an eﬀective risk management tool. This will depend largely on the risk-return
trade-oﬀ between the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts, and the adverse impacts in terms of the
level farm production and welfare.
For the part-time farmers the introduction of uncertainty leads to responses similar to full-time operators, but of lesser magnitude. While farm production is reduced
by the presence of risk, the impact on part-time operators is signiﬁcantly less (see
Figure 5.11). The impact of government farm revenue insurance programs also have
a much smaller impact on the farm production incentives of part-time operators. For
full-time operators, a revenue insurance program oﬀering 80% coverage can increase
production by up to 20% compared to a scenario without insurance. But production
would not increase by more than 10% for part-time operators.
This is because farm income risk has a much smaller impact on consumption and
welfare of part-time operators. The lower covariance between future marginal value
and current farm income shocks is reﬂected in the lower premium on farm inputs ( see
ﬁgure 5.13). Because the consumption and welfare of part-time operators is deﬁned
in large part by oﬀ-farm income, farm income risk and farm insurance have little
impact on their decisions. This is a direct outcome of the non-separability between
consumption and production induced by imperfect capital and labor markets. Under
these assumptions the farm decisions are driven by the consumption and welfare of
the operators and farm household, which in turn are inﬂuenced by their portfolio of
income sources.
A lower premium on farm inputs, in turn, implies that investment in agriculture
will be closer to its optimal level under certainty. Because of this, the return on equity
for part-time operators will also be little aﬀected by farm income risk and changes
in farm insurance programs. In contrast, farm income risk decreases the ROE for
full-time operations much more signiﬁcantly, and as a result the range of equity over
which part-time farm operation may be more proﬁtable than full-time operation will
increase under uncertainty. But the model suggests that this eﬀect, no matter what
79

60

100

50

80
60
40
Uncertainty
Certainty

20
0

% Change in Farm Output

Farm Output ($1,000)

120

0

500
1000
Equity ($1,000)

0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0

40% coverage
80% coverage
0

500
1000
Equity ($1,000)

40
30
20

0

500
1000
Equity ($1,000)

1500

40% coverage
80% coverage

0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0

1500

Uncertainty
Certainty

10
0

1500

% Change in Farm Output

Farm Output ($1,000)

Figure 5.11: Production under Uncertainty
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level of insurance is available, remains small. Hence, when focusing on farm production and competitiveness, the calibrated model indicates that the ﬁnancial beneﬁts
of part-time operations are not enough to overcome its negative impact on farm profitability.
However, a much more sizable eﬀect of risk is reﬂected in the relative change in
welfare between full-time and part-time operators. Not only is it the variable that
is most aﬀected by risk, it is also the one that drives the decision making process
of agents. The top panel of Figure 5.14 shows that under uncertainty, part-time operation becomes optimal for a much larger range of equity levels. Under certainty
part-time operation was optimal when equity was less than $400,000. Under uncertainty this range increases up to $1,000,000. This would suggest that the presence of
subsidized insurance has a large role to play in shifting the choice toward full-time
operation, and that without it the number of part-time operators may increase substantially.
Also, the previous analysis was based on the optimal choices at period 1 of the
model, i.e. when operators are 25 years away from retirement. When moving closer to
retirement the diversiﬁcation value of labor decreases because its discounted present
value shrinks with the number of working periods remaining. As a result, operators
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Figure 5.12: Risk Premium of Part-time Operators
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tend to become slightly more conservative and the welfare of part-time operators
dominates that of full-time operators over an increasingly larger range of equity.

Summary
Overall, this scenario shows that part-time operators are less aﬀected by insurance
programs, which may suggest that their increasing number would undermine the policy rationale based on farm income risk and its adverse eﬀects on operators’ decisions
and welfare. First, in this model part-time operators are less responsive to risk policies not because they have diﬀerent farm objectives but rather because they beneﬁt
from diversiﬁed income sources and do not need to leverage their equity as much as
full-time operators.
However, the cost of diversiﬁcation in terms of lower farm proﬁtability and intensity of production remains relatively high. Hence, despite the fact that full-time
operators may be induced to reduce the intensity and proﬁtability of their operation
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Figure 5.13: Return on Equity of Part-time Operators
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under uncertainty, they remain more proﬁtable than part-time operators with similar
characteristics. As a result, while operators labor diversiﬁcation reduces the impact
of risk on farm input demand and production decisions, it also appears as a undesirable outcome of risky farm income if fostering farm production and investment is the
main policy objective.
Even so, the income earned from oﬀ-farm employment may compensate for lower
farm returns, thus making the overall proﬁtability of the operators ﬁnancial and
human capital comparable to full-time operators, at least at lower levels of equity.
Moreover, the higher level of diversiﬁcation leads to higher welfare for part-time operators compared to full-time operators over a fairly large range of equity. Hence,
the model suggests that the desirability of part-time operation as a risk management
tool depends highly on policy and social objectives.
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Figure 5.14: Welfare of Part-time Operators
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5.4

Spousal Income

This scenario includes the presence of a spouse working oﬀ the farm and sharing
income as per the sharing rule deﬁned by the budget constraint in 3.9. In such a case
diversiﬁcation takes place at the household level and while the operator is allowed
to seek part or full-time employment oﬀ the farm, his/her incentives to do so are
likely to be reduced by the presence of a spouse. This scenario makes the implicit
assumption that spousal labor allocation decisions are mostly independent of the
farm labor and managerial constraint. It thus eliminates the negative impact of oﬀfarm labor diversiﬁcation on the farm enterprise. Such a scenario represents a fairly
common case, based on U.S. ARMS data Ahearn (February 23, 2012) reports that
in 2010, 82 percent of principal operators reported being married and about half of
their spouses worked oﬀ the farm.
The presence of a spouse working oﬀ the farm implies not only a diversiﬁcation of
income sources but also a ﬂow of liquidity that will relax the credit and liquidity con-
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Figure 5.15: Impact of Spousal Income on Farm Production
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straints. The impact of spousal labor diversiﬁcation on farm production decisions is
shown in Figure 5.15. The top panel compares the optimal expected level of production with and without a spouse. It shows that the level of production in the presence
of a spouse working oﬀ the farm and with farm revenue insurance with 40% coverage
is comparable to the level of production with 80% coverage and no spousal income.
The diversiﬁcation beneﬁts of spousal income are also reﬂected in the lower panels
which compares the responsiveness of farm production to changes in farm revenues
insurance coverage.
Besides the diversiﬁcation in income, the other diﬀerence implied by the presence
of a spouse is equity sharing, which result in lower welfare of the operator. Because
it is assumed that equity is shared between spouses upon retirement, it leads to lower
operator welfare but also to a higher saving and investment motive. Figure 5.16
shows that the welfare of single operators is higher for equity levels above $500,000.
However, changes in farm revenue insurance have a much smaller impact on operator
welfare in the presence of spousal income.
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Figure 5.16: Impact of Spousal Income on Welfare
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Overall, the presence of a spouse working oﬀ the farm provides an eﬃcient risk
management alternative. It does reduce the adverse eﬀect of farm income risk on farm
production decisions and farm proﬁtability. It thus limits the potential for resource
misallocations due to farm income risk. While it may lead to a decrease in operator’s
welfare, this is the result of a personal choice, that of sharing his/her life and equity
with a spouse.7 Clearly, the choice of having a spouse is not deﬁned by farm income
risk and farm policies. However, the model suggests that the presence of a spouse
may well aﬀect the eﬀectiveness and need for farm income stabilization policies. This
model indicates that spousal income provides a risk management alternative that is
consistent with policy rationale deﬁned either in terms of farm production and investment, farm competitiveness, or operator’s and household’s welfare. Consequently,
7
The model abstracts from the possibility of prenuptial agreements that would separate initial
operator’s equity from the common pool of equity acquired by the spouses during their common life.
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these result suggest that the value of farm programs crucially depends on whether
the unit of analysis is the household or the farm enterprise.

5.5

Implications and Conclusions

Once calibrated on the KFBM data, numerical solutions of the dynamic model developed in Chapter 3 were derived to assess the role of oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation in
mitigating the adverse eﬀect of farm income risk. The model includes capital market
imperfections, economies of scale in farm production, and the presence of adjustment
costs in labor allocation decisions. The model provides a more thorough and realistic
characterization of the environment deﬁning income and ﬁnancial risks faced by farm
operators, as well as the risk management alternatives available to them.
As a ﬁrst step, the analysis focused on the role of oﬀ-farm income in deﬁning the
downside risk faced by operators of commercial size farms. In the case of catastrophic
risk, if farmers are forced to abandon farming, adjusting to oﬀ-farm employment is
the most likely alternative. Hence, accessibility to oﬀ-farm labor markets deﬁnes the
downside risk of farm operators. The solutions and simulation of the model calibrated
on KFBM data show that this option to exit can aﬀect the farm decision of full-time
operators and mitigate the impact of farm income risk on operators farm decisions
and welfare. The value of the option to exit farming is ampliﬁed by the presence
of credit constraints combined with economies of scale over a range of smaller commercial farm sizes. It also depends in part on adjustment costs reﬂecting the degree
of labor mobility and access to dynamic labor markets. The value of this option is
greater for younger operators, which would imply that, for similar levels of equity
and farming skills, younger operators would be willing to shoulder more risk to enter or remain into farming. This is in line with the ﬁndings of Bodie, Merton, and
Samuelson (1992).
In fact, even in the case of part-time farm operation or spousal oﬀ-farm income,
the value of oﬀ-farm labor diversiﬁcation as a risk management tool is found to decline as operators get closer to retirement. This is in line with the adjusted portfolio
rule presented in equation 3.1, which shows that as the discounted value of future
labor income declines, it becomes optimal to diversify a greater portion of wealth into
risk free assets. Hence, the model predicts that, ceteris paribus, older operators will
be more conservative and less inclined to invest in risky farm assets. This implication from the model also suggests that the role of oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation as a risk
management tool would be more limited for older operators. However, the typical
life cycle also implies a build up of equity and savings which can compensate for the
reduction in the value of human capital.
An interesting consequence of this exit option is the non-monotonic relation between risk responsiveness and equity. It is usually assumed that increasing wealth
and equity will decrease the magnitude of risk responses. However, the model implies
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that as operators get closer to the switching point their behavior will move gradually
towards more risk neutral or even risk loving behavior, such that operators with low
levels of equity will tend to be less responsive to risk. Whether this prediction of the
model is corroborated by the data is unknown and represents an interesting implication to test in further research. It also raises the question of whether this switching
regime behavior may contribute to explain the low interest of farmers in insurance
products.
The actual diversiﬁcation of labor oﬀ the farm is also found to mitigate the impact of normal risk on farm operation decisions and welfare. It allows the smoothing
of consumption and reduces the ﬁnancial risk faced by operators and households.
However, the impact on farm production can be ambiguous. The diversiﬁcation of
labor by the main operator seems to impose labor and managerial constraints that
can reduce the intensity and technical eﬃciency of the farm enterprise. Even so,
the income and beneﬁts earned from oﬀ-farm employment may compensate for lower
farm returns, thus making the overall proﬁtability of the operator’s ﬁnancial and human capital comparable to full-time operators with similar characteristics. Given the
higher level of diversiﬁcation, the welfare of part-time operators may even be higher
than full-time operators. But the farm production intensity and eﬀectiveness is likely
to remain below that of full-time operators. Hence, the desirability of part-time operation as a risk management tool is found to depend highly on policy and social
objectives.
Alternatively, diversiﬁcation at the household level through the allocation of
spousal labor oﬀ the farm provides beneﬁts in mitigating the adverse eﬀects of farm
income risk on farm production and eﬃciency, and on operators’ and households’
welfare. It thus provides an eﬃcient risk management alternative that is consistent
with most rationales that can be invoked to justify farm policies.
Finally, the model also displays some shortcomings and limitations. One omission
of the model is land ownership. Ownership remains the preferred method among operators to gain control over land. It also implies opportunities for capital gains which
are often key in deﬁning ﬁnancial wealth of operators and in turn their borrowing
capacity. Hence, it may be that to capture the full breath of ﬁnancial risk and decisions facing operators, the choice between ownership and rental agreement should be
included. Also, for simplicity the model assumes that shocks are purely transitory in
nature. However, there may well be some degree of persistence in farm income shocks
and the response to permanent and transitory shocks may diﬀer. The buﬀer stock
model literature suggests that, compare to temporary socks, permanent shocks have
a much larger impact on agents consumption and investment decisions (Haliassos and
Michaelides, 2003). Thus, the introduction of degree of persistence in farm income
shocks may have large impacts on the risk of bankruptcy and the optimal ﬁnancial
structure, and, as a result, it may imply in a much larger role for oﬀ-farm income as
a risk management tool. If other risk management alternatives such as future and
forward contracts, and on farm diversiﬁcation were also introduced, it could also re87

veal some degree of complementarity between short-term risk management tools and
oﬀ-farm employment.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions

The increasing inﬂuence of nonfarm economic sectors and general economic growth
on the welfare, structure and performance of the farm sector has long been recognized. In particular, the development and diversiﬁcation of most rural economies
created new opportunities for oﬀ-farm employment and played a key role in raising
the average income of farm households, thus dissipating most of the policy concerns
related to chronically depressed farm income. As a result, farm policies are now focusing on farm income risk and much of the policy debates center on the eﬃciency
of subsidized crop and farm revenues insurance programs. While acknowledging the
incompleteness of capital and risk markets, many economists argue that subsidized
programs are ineﬃcient because they tend to crowd out private initiatives, including
oﬀ-farm income. Hence, the role of oﬀ-farm income as a private risk management tool
has generated some interest and a number of empirical studies suggest the existence
of a positive relationship between farm income risk and oﬀ-farm income.
While it is usually presumed that the use of oﬀ-farm income as a risk management
tool is limited to smaller farms, this research suggests that oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation is
a potent risk management tool for large and even very large crop farms. Based on
current policy concerns and the growing importance of oﬀ-farm income as a component of farm households total income, this dissertation set out to formally examine
the extent to which oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation can mitigate the adverse eﬀect of farm
income risk on resource allocation and welfare among commercial farm operators and
households. The interactions between farm income stabilization policies and households’ labor allocation decisions are analyzed using a dynamic optimization model
calibrated on a sample of commercial grain farms and much of the eﬀort has been directed towards deﬁning a realistic model of the diversiﬁcation premium and ﬁnancial
beneﬁts provided by the steady ﬂow of liquid income generated by oﬀ-farm employment.
The study provides a theoretical argument justifying the focus on the farm household as the relevant decision making unit, and presents some of the implications of
doing so in assessing the impact of farm income risk. It is suggested that oﬀ-farm
income can be advantageous not only in addressing distributional and equity issues
but also the resource allocation and eﬃciency issues that are presumed to underlie
current risk management policies. By adding to the list of private risk management
tools available to farm households, oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation reduces the potential beneﬁts of farm income insurance programs and strengthens the argument that the social
cost of these programs is greater than the cost of relying only on incomplete private
risk management tools.
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By highlighting the potential of oﬀ-farm labor diversiﬁcation in addressing farm
income risk issues, the results also raise questions on the nature of interactions and the
potential complementarity between farm policies and rural development eﬀorts. Over
the last decades most rural economies have grown and diversiﬁed away from agricultural commodity production, providing arguments to shift resources away from farm
policies towards more broad-based rural development eﬀorts. The complementarity
between rural development and farm policies may be region speciﬁc, depending on
the importance of commodity production and the diversity of the local economies in
diﬀerent rural areas. But, while it has been argued elsewhere that broader economic
policies had a large inﬂuence in closing the income gap between farm and urban
households, it may also be that policies other than conventional farm policies have a
role to play in addressing farm income risk issues and, in some cases, may represent
more sustainable and eﬃcient policy alternatives.

Modeling oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation beneﬁts
To explore the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation a dynamic stochastic model
was chosen based on theoretical and empirical considerations. In developing the
model, the farm households’ consumption decisions and production decisions are assumed to be non-separable due to some degree of incompleteness in the labor and
capital markets, as supported by the empirical literature. The use of a household
model where consumption is taken as the ultimate objective of the decision makers
was thus justiﬁed by this non-separability of consumption and production.
Also, risk aversion is unlikely to be the sole cause of risk responses by farmers. In
fact, the empirical literature indicated that the dynamic implications of labor allocation decisions, including labor mobility and the potential role of oﬀ-farm employment
in providing liquidity and smoothing consumption, could be of importance. This
suggested that a dynamic model including ﬁnancial and labor mobility constraints
may be more appropriate than a static expected utility model to explore the eﬀects
of oﬀ-farm employment on farm households’ welfare and production decisions.
Consequently, the model presented in this dissertation integrates credit constraints
and labor ﬂexibility within a farm household life-cycle model. The model borrows
from the buﬀer-stock saving models developed in the consumption and ﬁnance literature, and successfully endogenizes the trade-oﬀs between farm business risk and
ﬁnancial risk. Such models have been used to explore the impact of labor income
risk and credit constraints on consumption and investment choices. In this type of
model, labor income acts as a risk free asset allowing for consumption smoothing,
and inducing more aggressive investment in risky assets as well as a reduction in the
demand for insurance.
While standard expected utility models focus solely on the diversiﬁcation eﬀect
associated with oﬀ-farm employment, the proposed model also accounts for the liq90

uidity and the ﬂexibility provided by human capital. Hence, the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of
oﬀ-farm employment embedded in the model can be summarize in three parts: 1) the
ﬂexibility in human capital allocation providing a farm exit option in case of catastrophic risk, 2) the diversiﬁcation of income, 3) the value of the liquidity provided
by oﬀ-farm employment. All of these eﬀects may alter operators’ and households’
welfare as well as their investment and production decisions. While some attempts at
valuing the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts of oﬀ-farm employment are provided in the literature, none accounted for labor and capital market imperfections, thus leaving income
liquidity and labor ﬂexibility aspects largely unexplored.

Empirical ﬁndings - diversiﬁcation premium
The existence and magnitude of the diversiﬁcation premium was investigated empirically in Chapter 4 by estimating a distance function that includes farm and oﬀ-farm
outputs. A Bayesian estimation approach was followed in order to impose theoretical
regularity conditions during the estimation. The results show that failing to satisfy
those theoretical constraints yields counterintuitive results implying a negative diversiﬁcation premium. However, when the theoretical constraints are imposed the
estimates suggest the presence of an oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation premium. These results
illustrate the impact of theoretical constraints on estimates and reiterate the importance of testing and, if necessary, imposing theoretical consistency.
The oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation premium implied by theoretically consistent models is
relatively small for commercial Kentucky grain farms operating less than 1500 acres
but increases signiﬁcantly on larger farms. This tend to conﬁrm the conventional wisdom that, as a risk management tool, oﬀ-farm income is somewhat limited by the size
of farm operations. However, farms of 1500 acres were well above the U.S. national
average farm size over the period 1998-2010, and it represents the average size for
Kentucky commercial grain farms. Overall, this suggests that while diversiﬁcation of
operators’ labor may not be accessible to the largest of commercial farms, it does remain accessible at a low premium even for farms much larger than the small hobby or
limited resource farms, making it of potential relevance for farm stabilization policies.
In addition, the limitations of the data must be kept in mind in interpreting these
estimates. The sample used in this dissertation only included farms with a single
operator and the estimated premium is based on the diversiﬁcation of the labor from
the main operator. The premium would likely be lower when considering diversiﬁcation of spousal labor or for farms with multiple operators. Hence, the estimated
premium may be seen as an upper bound estimate, in which case the range of farms
for which oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation is a potent risk management strategy would expand
to cover most commercial farms.
In the context of an evolving farm structure and technology, the diversiﬁcation
premium may change over time. While increases in factors like the managerial capac91

ity of operators and the access to labor market may reduce the premium, the evolution
of the diversiﬁcation premium will likely hinge in large part on future technological
developments. If new technologies are labor-saving, the premium may actually be
reduced, depending on whether signiﬁcant economies of scale are also induced by
these technological changes. The empirical evidence from the last 30 years suggest
that while farm size has kept increasing, the range over which economies of scale
prevail in the crop sector may have increased in absolute terms but remains limited
to small and medium sized farms. One can only speculate about the direction of
future technological changes, but if the past is any indication we may not see large
increases in the oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation premium among commercial grain farmers.

Implications for risk management policies
The last part of the dissertation is based on a numerical analysis of the calibrated
dynamic model and puts in relation the diversiﬁcation premium previously estimated
with the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation embedded in the dynamic model. The
results suggest that part-time farming maybe of greater interest with respect to distributional and welfare policy objectives. First, the presence of economies of scale in
combination with imperfect capital and labor markets generate a non-monotonic risk
response among full-time operators. There is a critical level of equity beyond which
the risk response decreases as liquidity and credit constraints are relaxed. But, if
equity falls below that critical level of equity, the risk response becomes constrained
on the one hand by the need to achieve economies of scale while facing binding credit
constraints, and on the other hand by the presence of transaction costs if he/she
chooses to diversify some or all of its labor oﬀ the farm. This implies that as the
ﬁnancial position of operators becomes more precarious, insurance becomes of little
use for them and has little to no eﬀect on their behavior, while access to oﬀ-farm
employment and part-time operation becomes more beneﬁcial.
Second, a potential reduction in farm revenue insurance coverage would have a
much larger impact on full-time operators’ welfare and farm production decisions
compared to those working oﬀ the farm. Such reduction would also lead to a signiﬁcant drop in production and proﬁtability of full-time operators, some of which would
ﬁnd it optimal to switch to part-time operation. Higher labor mobility between farm
and non-farm sector would facilitate the transition to part-time operation, would increase the number of operators adopting this strategy, and would also contribute in
limiting the welfare cost of reducing insurance coverage. However, the diversiﬁcation
premium does impose a cost in term of farm production and proﬁtability. The calibrated model indicates that farm production and proﬁtability of part-time operators
remain below that of full-time farmers despite the fact that risk represents a smaller
cost to them. As a result, to the extent that farm policy is intended to reduce the
adverse eﬀect of farm income risk on farm production and proﬁtability, part-time
operation would not be consistent with such policy objectives, but it would be consistent with other welfare and distributional policy objectives.
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At the same time, national data and anecdotal evidence suggest that spousal
oﬀ-farm income has become a common occurrence among farms of all sizes. And
there is some historical evidence of it being use to address farm income risk. The
results from the calibrated model show that the household’s welfare and farm production decisions in the presence of a spouse working oﬀ the farm and with farm
revenue insurance with 40% coverage are comparable to those with 80% coverage
and no spousal income. It thus supports the idea that spousal income could reduce
signiﬁcantly the adverse impact of farm income risk on the welfare and production
decisions of households operating large commercial farms. It suggests that subsidized
farm revenue insurance may crowd out the use of household labor diversiﬁcation, a
private risk management strategy that appears perfectly consistent with welfare and
eﬃciency objectives presumed to underlie farm policies.
Also, oﬀ-farm income may be advantageous in helping farm households to cope
with permanent or persistent farm income shocks. Current farm revenue insurance
programs such as ACRE and the Canadian Agri-Stability programs are based on
multi-year averages, thus oﬀering some protection even when shocks are persistent.
On the other hand, most private risk management tools such as futures and forward
contracts provide insurance only against short-term intra-year shocks. The capacity
of oﬀ-farm employment in addressing long term and persistent shocks may thus be a
useful complement to other private risk management tools. The analysis provided in
this dissertation is limited to temporary shocks, but it may be of interest to extend
it to explore the impact of oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation when farm income shocks are persistent and other risk management tools such as futures contracts are introduced in
the model.
Another interesting aspect of oﬀ-farm diversiﬁcation is its natural targeting characteristics. Over time, numerous attempts have been made to improve the targeting
of commodity programs, mainly by imposing payment limits. This indicates a desire to improve the distributional impact of those policies. For oﬀ-farm income, the
numerical analysis presented in this dissertation shows that the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of
diversiﬁcation are more important for younger and low equity operators facing more
substantial ﬁnancial and liquidity risk. This is driven by the natural balance between
the discounted value of future labor earnings, and the accumulated equity. For young
operators, the higher value of labor earning potential provides an hedge against future farm income shocks, while operators closer to retirement will tend to face lower
ﬁnancial risk due to accumulated equity.

Limitations and potential extensions
From a methodological point of view, this dissertation extends the conventional risk
analysis models by integrating intertemporal behavior into the analysis. While our
understanding of risk responses and our capacity to identify the underlying cause
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of risk responses remain limited, the empirical literature strongly suggests that intertemporal trade-oﬀs and credit constraints play a signiﬁcant role in deﬁning farm
household allocation decisions. And understanding these decisions is crucial in improving our capacity to formulate policy recommendations. Thus, by modeling various dynamic aspects of the decision making of farm households, the objective is to
provide a better understanding of the complex allocation problems that farmers face,
to improve our ability to understand an increasingly complex farm structure, and to
formulate stronger policy recommendations.
For risk analysis purposes, the ideal analytical framework should encompass all
relevant sources of risk, and all risk management tools available to the decision makers. By adopting a dynamic framework, the approach presented in this dissertation
broadens the scope of risk management instruments by including some degree of labor mobility and the capacity of households to save and smooth consumption over
time. Hence, the buﬀer stock dynamic model used in this dissertation provides a more
thorough and realistic characterization of the level of risk faced by farm operators
by focusing on household consumption and by endogenizing ﬁnancial risk decisions
in the framework. New hypotheses could be derive from such framework and help us
understand the ﬁnancial implications of farm household decisions. For example, the
model revealed that market imperfections could imply a non-monotonic risk response.
Whether the non-linear relationship implied by this dynamic model can contribute to
explain the historically low participation of farmer in insurance markets is unknown,
but it might represent an interesting hypothesis to test empirically.
Yet, while the modeling approach presented here may represent a useful analytical
tool, the calibration of the model could be improved in a number of ways. First of
all, household risk and intertemporal preferences should ideally be identiﬁed independently and empirically. From a modeling point of view, alternatives exist to separate
risk and intertemporal preferences within the context of a buﬀer stock model (e.g.
Epstein-Zin utility function). However, identiﬁcation of preference parameters would
require behavioral data in addition to production and consumption data. At the
same time, even if only production data are available they could be used to estimate
the risk implications of changes in farm input mix, and thus add farm input choices
as another potential risk management tool. This could be done, for example, by
estimating a state-contingent distance function, although such estimation still faces
a number of challenges.
And, as was already mentioned, it would be of interest to investigate the impact
of persistence in the stochastic process followed by farm income shocks. The buﬀer
stock model literature suggests that, compare to temporary socks, permanent shocks
have a much larger impact on agents consumption and investment decisions .Thus,
the introduction of some degree of persistence in farm income shocks may have large
impacts on the optimal ﬁnancial structure, and it may imply a more important role
for oﬀ-farm income as a risk management tool. If other risk management alternatives
such as future and forward contracts were also introduced, this type of model exten94

sion could be used to explore the degree of complementarity between short-term risk
management tools and oﬀ-farm employment.
Another key determinant of ﬁnancial risk is farmland investment. Ownership is
still the preferred method among operators to gain control over land which remains
the primary asset of most farm households. Returns on land assets are largely determined by capital gains which are key in deﬁning ﬁnancial wealth of operators and
in turn their borrowing capacity. Hence, it may be that to capture the full breath
of ﬁnancial risks and decisions that farm operators are facing, the choice between
ownership and rental agreement should be included. This would also provide the opportunity to consider equity ﬁnancing as part of the array of private risk management
tools.
In general, risk analysis remains fraught with diﬃculties, most importantly understanding and identifying sources of risk responses is still a challenging task. However,
the policy focus on risk management issues demands that we keep improving our capacity to derive meaningful policy recommendations. It is hoped that by providing a
more complete representation of the microeconomic environment of farm households,
including the market imperfections that are presumed to underly policy rationales,
the type of model presented in this dissertation can help in developing further understanding of farm households choices and policy responses.
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Appendix A: Proﬁt Maximization and the Input Distance Function

The input distance can be related to a proﬁt maximizing problem of the type:
max
p · y − w · x s.t. D(x, y) ≥ 1
y,x
Following Simon and Blume (1994, p.467), the second order condition for such a
problem requires checking the sign of the leading principal minors of the bordered
Hessian1 :
⎡
⎤
O
−Dy
−Dx
⎢
⎥
BH = ⎣ −Dy λL Dyy λL Dyx ⎦
−Dx λL Dyx λL Dxx
In case of single output and input, the condition can be expressed as:
det(BH) = λL Dx [−Dx Dy,y + Dy Dx,y ] − λL Dy [−Dx Dx,y + Dy Dx,x ]


= λ −Dx2 Dx,y + 2Dx Dy Dx,y − Dy2 Dx,x



Where Dx = sD
and Dy = rD
with s and r being deﬁned by equation 4.3 and 4.4.
x
y
Other expressions are deﬁned as follows:
(βx,x + s2 − s) · D
x2
(γx,y + s · r) · D
=
x·y
(αy,y + r2 − r) · D
=
y2

Dx,x =
Dx,y
Dy,y

Given homogeneity in input of the input distance we know that s = 1. And the
determinant of the brodered Hessian can be expressed as:

det(BH) =


λD3 
2
2
−α
,
+r
+
r
+
2rγ
−
r
β
y,y
x,y
x,x
x2 y 2

In this simple case, the condition would require that the determinant is positive.
Under constant return to scale, r = −1 and satisfying this condition would require
that (−αy,y −2γx,y −βx,x ) > 0. But the condition can be met even if there is increasing
returns to scale, i.e. r > −1. It would simply require that some of the second order
coeﬃcients, β, γ, α, be negative and their magnitude to be large enough to oﬀset
1
The largest principal leading minor should be of the same sign as (−1)n−k where n is the size
of BH and k is the number of constraints ( 1 in this case)

108

the eﬀect of increasing return to scale. In fact, this condition can be veriﬁed to be
equivalent to the slope of the marginal product of input x while keeping the distance
(D) constant:
∂y
−s · y
=
∂x
r·x

y 
∂2y
= 3 2 −αy,y , +r + r2 + 2rγx,y − r2 βx,x
∂x∂x
r x
Under standard production economics assumptions, the marginal product becomes negative at some point during stage I of production, while economies of scale
are exhausted at some point in stage II of production. For an illustration of the relationships between marginal product, economies of scale, and stages of production see
Doll and Orazem (1984, p.48). As a result, imposing the second order condition of a
proﬁt maximization problem on the estimation of an input distance function does not
preclude the presence and estimation of economies of scale. It does, however, impose
the assumption that operators are facing decreasing marginal return to farm inputs.
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Appendix B: Output Distance Function

The output distance function can be expressed as:




yit
= inf θ > 0 : xit ,
∈ T (zit ) ≤ 1
θ
θ
where xit , yit are the set of inputs and outputs, respectively, for farm household
i in year t. Where T is a technology set deﬁning the possible combination of outputs yit , inputs xit , given the set of socioeconomic, demographic, and agro-climatic
characteristics zit. Hence, an output distance functions estimates by how much the
output set could be expanded while maintaining the same input set.
Dito (xit , yit , zit )

Translog output distance function
The translog functional output distance function takes the same form as the input
distance function in equation 4.2:
ln Dito

= β0 +

J


βj ln xj,it +

J
N 

n

L


αn ln yn,it + 0.5 ·

n

j

+0.5 ·

N


J 
K

j

γnj ln xj,it ln yn,it + 0.5 ·

M
N 

n

j

βjk ln xj,it ln xk,it

k

αnm ln yn,it ln ym,it

m

φl ln zl,it + vi t

l

As a result the elasticity measures from both speciﬁcations have the same func
tional form. Following equation 4.5, homogeneity in output implies that rn = 1 so

that η scale = ( si ).

Regularity Conditions
Production theory suggest that the distance function should satisfy a number of
regularity conditions (Fare and Primont, 1995; Coelli et al., 2005). An output distance
function should be:
1. homogeneous of degree one in output;
2. monotonically increasing in output;
3. monotonically decreasing in inputs;
4. quasi-convex in inputs;
5. convex in outputs.
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Estimation
Since distance D is unknown, for estimation we can rearrange the output distance
function Do as follow
− ln Fit = β0 +

J

j

⎛

J 
L
K

1
βj ln xj,it +
βjk ln xj,it ln xk,it +
φl ln zl,it
2 j k
l

+λit ⎝βy

+

J


β̃j ln xj,it + αy ln yit∗

j

+

J

j

⎞

γyj ln xj,it ln yit∗ +

αyy
(ln yit∗ )2 ⎠ + vi t − ln Dio
2

ln Fit = −βXit − γXYit − αYit − φZit − vit + ui
where * indicates outputs that are normalized by the numeraire output F . This
transformation is possible given the homogeneity of the distance function in output,
which implies that θD(y, x) = D(θy, x). Equation 6.1 is obtained by letting θ = F1
and transferring the eﬃciency term to the right hand side. The last line represents a
more compact formulation where vit is a standard error term while ln Di = −ui ≥ 0
provides a measure of the distance and technical eﬃciency, Do = T Ei = e−ui .
The model is estimated as a random eﬀect model following the Bayesian approach
developed by O’Donnell and Coelli (2005) and presented in Chapter 4. In this framework, the random variable ui is assumed to follow an exponential distribution with
parameter λ. The standard error term vi is assumed to follow a normal distribution
centered at zero and with variance h−1 .

Estimation results
The coeﬃcient estimates of the output distance function for the unconstrained and
constrained (imposing all regularity conditions) models are presented in Table B.1.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the main disadvantage of the output distance function
are the constraints it imposes on the relationship between oﬀ-farm output and other
variables. In particular, homogeneity in output adds a number of restrictions on
the coeﬃcients deﬁning the relation between inputs and outputs (γ), and the relation among outputs (αi,j ). With only two outputs, imposing convexity requires that
−αy,f = αf,f = αy,y ≥ 0.25 which directly implies some degree of economies of scope
for the entire range of output.
Figure B.1 and Figure B.2 show the estimated elasticity of scale for the constrained and unconstrained models. When compare to Figure 4.5, it is clear that
the unconstrained input distance yields much higher estimates of economies of scale
compared to the unconstrained output model. The regularity constraints of either
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the input or output distance function do not appear to aﬀect this result. Only when
conditions related to proﬁt maximization are imposed on the input distance (model
3) does the pattern of economies of scale becomes closer to the ones estimated by the
output distance function.
This result is similar to what Paul et al. (2004) obtained and would suggest that
either the orientation of the distance function or some bias due to endogenous variables would lead to an overestimation of economies of scale by the input distance
function or an underestimation by the output distance function. Nevertheless, given
the lack of ﬂexibility inherent to the output orientation, at least in the 2 outputs case,
it appears more advantageous to use an input orientation even if proﬁt maximization
conditions must be imposed to obtain a function that is well-behaved and suitable to
calibrate the simulation model.
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Table B.1: Parameter Estimates
Parameters
β0
βdy1
αY
αF†
α̃F
βH
βV C
βK
β̃H
β̃V C
β̃K
βH,H
βH,V C
βH,K
γH,Y
†
γH,F
βV C,V C
βV C,K
γV C,Y
γV† C,F
βK,K
γK,Y
†
γK,F
αY,Y
†
αY,F
†
αF,F
βLD
β̃LD
βH,LD
βV C,LD
βK,LD
βLD,LD
γLD,Y
†
γLD,F
φage
φf amsize
φcurr.ratio
φROADA
φyear

Unconstrained
-0.001
0.068
0.161
0.839
-0.0656
-0.545
-0.145
-0.057
0.259
-0.057
-0.018
-0.040
0.002
0.022
-0.022
0.128
-0.004
-0.196
-0.196
-0.099
0.067
-0.067
0.064
-0.064
0.064
-0.261
-0.066
0.039
-0.155
0.039
0.280
0.288
-0.288
0.004
-0.008
-0.006
-0.027
-0.032

*
*
**
**
**
**
*
**
**

*
*
*
**

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

Constrained
-0.110
-0.030
0.270
0.730
-0.030
-0.592
-0.116
-0.023
0.128
-0.031
-0.002
-0.008
-0.003
-0.005
0.005
-0.007
-0.038
0.140
-0.140
-0.015
-0.066
0.066
0.255
-0.255
0.255
-0.278
0.041
0.003
0.026
0.013
0.108
0.156
-0.156
0.005
0.001
-0.005
-0.028
-0.033

*
**
**
**
**
**

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

*
**
**
**
**
**
**

†
Indicate the parameters derived from the homogeneity property of the distance function.
** Indicate that Pr(β<0|y)<0.05 for positive estimates and Pr(β>0|y)<0.05 for negative estimates.
* Indicate that Pr(β<0|y)<0.1 for positive estimates and Pr(β>0|y)<0.1 for negative estimates.
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Figure B.1: Economies of Scale
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Figure B.2: Economies of Scale
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Appendix C: Approximation of Risk Premium

If one takes a second order expansion of the covariance factor in equation 3.17, then
we can decompose this covariance into 2 factors.


rb (W, A) = E e · F



−1+







Cov e · F , VW (Wt+1 , Rt+1 )
E [V  ]

Let  ∼ N (0, σ), π = E[e ] and V is a value function with argument W =

g(A) + F e then taking a second order Taylor expansion of V :



V 


E V

e




2  

 
≈ V  +V  F + V  F
0
0
0
2
2


σ

 
≈ V  +
V  F
0
0
2

The last term on the LHS is known as the precautionary saving motive(Romer, 2001).
The distributional assumption on  also implies :
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Using these approximations and e − E[e ] ≈ , we get
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where φ is deﬁned by the second derivative of the value function and is thus akin
to a coeﬃcient of risk aversion while λ(σ 2 ) encapsulate the precautionary saving as a
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function of income variability. The coeﬃcient of risk aversion is usually presumed to
be negative, implying that the marginal value of additional equity is increasing at a
decreasing rate. And precautionary saving depends on the third derivative which is
presumed to be negative in most cases, implying that the marginal value falls more
slowly as equity increases.
As a result, the premium on farm inputs represents a combination of precautionary saving motive and risk aversion. A larger risk aversion coeﬃcient will lead to
higher premiums while increasing the precautionary saving motive will lead to higher
incentives to invest and thus lower premiums.

σ 2 φF
λ(σ 2 )


σ 2 σ 2 φF

+
−1
≈ F 1+
2
λ(σ 2 )

rb (W, A) ≈ E e · F



−1+F



The direct eﬀect of credit constraints is to make rb a function of equity W and of
positions in diﬀerent assets deﬁned by action variables A. At lower equity levels the
optimal marginal product will be higher as the interest rate on debt increases. However, credit constraints and other non-linearities in the model, including economies
of scale and adjustment costs, will also aﬀect the curvature of the value function thus
aﬀecting the covariance term in the last equation.
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Appendix D: Numerical Analysis: Further Results

Proﬁtability at lower farm eﬃciency level
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